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Against Administrative Judges 
Kent Barnett* 
The single largest cadre of federal adjudicators goes largely ignored by 
scholars, policymakers, courts, and even litigating parties. These 
Administrative Judges or “AJs,” often confused with well-known federal 
Administrative Law Judges or “ALJs,” operate by the thousands in 
numerous federal agencies. Yet unlike ALJs, the significantly more 
numerous AJs preside over less formal hearings and have no significant 
statutory provisions that preserve their impartiality. The national press 
has recently called attention to the alleged unfairness of certain ALJ 
proceedings, and regulated parties have successfully enjoined agencies’ use 
of ALJs. While fixes are necessary for ALJ adjudication, any solution that 
ignores more widespread, less independent, and less litigant-protective AJ 
adjudication falls woefully short. 
This Article argues that, contrary to agency orthodoxy and regardless of 
regulated parties’ interests, agencies should choose ALJs over AJs to 
further their own interests. With broad direction to choose AJs or ALJs, 
agencies prefer the former because of increased control over AJs’ job 
performance and policy implementation in flexible, informal proceedings 
— all for less cost. Yet, not only are the relative informality and cost 
savings of AJ proceedings exaggerated (based on data that this Article is 
the first to consider meaningfully), but the use of AJs has overlooked 
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downsides. Agency control of AJs undermines their perceived impartiality, 
creating unacknowledged due process concerns under two recent Supreme 
Court decisions — Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. and Free 
Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB — and complicating agencies’ missions. 
Choosing ALJs also increases the likelihood of agencies receiving 
deferential judicial review and absolute official immunity for agency 
adjudicators. Thus, this Article broadens and contextualizes the current 
ALJ controversy by highlighting the more pervasive and problematic 
phenomenon of AJs in administrative adjudication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal administrative adjudicators — Administrative Law Judges 
(“ALJs”) and their doppelgängers Administrative Judges (“AJs”) — 
comprise the “hidden judiciary.”1 Despite numbers and caseloads 
substantially larger than Article III courts’, ALJs and AJs mostly go 
about unnoticed, toiling in the shadows of agency rulemaking.2 
Scholarly attention to agency adjudication has, at best, been fleeting.3 
ALJs have, however, recently done something uncharacteristic: they 
got the national media’s attention — but not in a good way. The New 
York Times and The Wall Street Journal have reported that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) prevails much more 
frequently — sometimes 100% of the time in a given year — in its in-
house enforcement proceedings than in court.4 Whether or not 
selection effects impact those statistics’ validity,5 parties subject to 
 
 1 See Chris Guthrie et al., The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of 
Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1478 (2009). 
 2 Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Judges and Agency Policy Development: The Koch 
Way, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407, 409 (2013) (“Administrative adjudication as a 
whole gets much less attention in modern scholarship than rulemaking does.”). 
 3 Scholars last gave agency adjudication a sustained look in the early 1990s. See, 
e.g., 2 PAUL R. VERKUIL ET AL., ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
REPORTS 1058 (1992); John H. Frye III, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the 
Federal Government, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political 
Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and 
Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481 (1990) [hereinafter Political Control]; Paul R. Verkuil, 
Reflections Upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1992) 
[hereinafter Reflections]. In the past ten years, agency adjudication has only 
occasionally returned to meaningful scholarly discussion. See, e.g., Kent Barnett, 
Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797 (2013) [hereinafter Resolving the ALJ 
Quandary]; Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. 
L. REV. 693 (2005) [hereinafter Policymaking]; James E. Moliterno, The Administrative 
Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191 (2006); Bijal Shah, 
Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805 (2015).  
 4 Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803 [hereinafter 
SEC Wins]; Gretchen Morgenson, At the S.E.C., a Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/at-the-sec-a-question-of-
home-court-edge.html (contrasting SEC’s 88% win rate in ALJ hearings to its 63% win rate 
in district courts). For instance, the SEC prevailed in all agency proceedings in 2012, and 
in more than 75% in 2011, 2013, and 2014. In comparison, it prevailed in less than 75% of 
similar judicial proceedings. See id. 
 5 Perhaps the SEC prevails more often in its in-house tribunals because it is 
sending easier cases there rather than to federal court. See, e.g., Stephen Joyce, Rakoff, 
Practitioners Question SEC Practice of Sending More Enforcement Cases to ALJs, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.bna.com/rakoff-practitioners-question-
n17179923714/; infra Part IV.A.2. 
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these increasingly frequent proceedings have taken note.6 In several 
recent judicial proceedings, they have challenged — and have had 
enjoined7 — those SEC administrative proceedings on separation-of-
powers grounds, complained of the limited protections and 
procedures that those proceedings afford them, and emphasized the 
partiality concerns that arise from the SEC’s higher win rate before its 
own judges than before Article III courts.8 
When responding to the partiality concerns (and a disruptive 
attempt to depose an ALJ), the SEC did something very curious. It 
invited the ALJ at issue to file an affidavit to declare whether he had 
felt undue pressure from the SEC to rule in the agency’s favor.9 The 
ALJ declined to do so,10 creating an unfavorable impression of 
impinged independence. A former ALJ’s recent allegations that she 
came under fire for ruling against the SEC only magnified this 
impression.11 
What the public and even many lawyers may not realize is that this 
high-profile indictment of the SEC’s in-house proceedings implicates 
the most formal, most litigant-protective form of federal agency 
adjudication — so-called “formal adjudication” under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).12 Numerous, if not most, 
 
 6 See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 21, 2014, 9:40 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-
judges-it-appoints-1413849590 (quoting Kara Brockmeyer, head of the SEC’s anti-
foreign-corruption enforcement unit). 
 7 See Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1320-21 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (granting 
preliminary injunction based on substantial likelihood of Appointments Clause 
violation); accord Duka v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-00357, 2015 WL 4940083, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2015). 
 8 See, e.g., Gray Fin. Group, Inc. v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-00492-LMM (N.D. Ga. Aug. 
4, 2015); Timbervest v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-02106-LMM (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015); Tilton 
v. SEC, No. 15-cv-02472-RA (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015); Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1304; 
Stilwell v. SEC, No. 14-cv-7931 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2014). 
 9 Timbervest, LLC, SEC File No. 3-15519 (June 4, 2015), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/2015/ia-4103.pdf. 
 10 Cara Salvatore, SEC Judge Refuses to Say Whether He Favors Agency, LAW360 
(June 12, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/667248/sec-judge-refuses-to-say-
whether-he-favors-agency. 
 11 See Eaglesham, SEC Wins, supra note 4 (referring to former SEC ALJ Lillian 
McEwen, who complained of coming “under fire” for finding in favor of regulated 
parties). 
 12 The SEC’s enforcement proceedings are required to be “on the record, after 
notice and opportunity for hearing,” when it seeks to impose a civil penalty. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77h–1(g)(1) (2012). That phrase serves as triggering language under the APA to 
require formal adjudication protections. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012). Those 
protections include requiring an ALJ to preside (in the absence of the agency or its 
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agency adjudications — more than 550,000 annually13 — are less 
formal than those formal SEC proceedings. And, most importantly for 
this Article, these informal proceedings are overseen by mere AJs, 
agency employees whose number is likely twice as large as ALJs.14 
Agencies across the federal administrative state use AJs, but AJs are 
most prevalent in the Department of Commerce (with more than 
1,000 AJs), the Internal Revenue Service (950), the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (306), the Department of Justice (250), and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (111).15 ALJs and AJs perform 
the same function: they preside over oral hearings to award benefits 
and licenses, enforce agency penalties, and adjudicate claims primarily 
between private parties. Indeed, some agencies use both ALJs and AJs 
to hear the exact same kinds of cases, including federal employment 
cases before the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”).16 
Despite sharing nearly identical titles and functions with ALJs, AJs 
lack the statutory protection from removal, professional discipline, 
and performance reviews that ALJs have under the APA.17 Relatedly, 
agencies directly hire AJs, while another independent agency, the 
Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”), oversees ALJ hiring. 
Unlike ALJs, AJs can (and often do) carry out other duties for the 
agency when not presiding over hearings. Perhaps most unsettling, no 
statute prohibits them from communicating ex parte with agency 
officials during and about their hearings.18 These distinctions provide 
agencies more control over AJs than ALJs (and, reflexively, AJs less 
independence than ALJs). Despite their widespread use and obvious 
lack of independence, AJs’ understandable confusion with better-
known ALJs means that they are “the real hidden judiciary.”19 
 
members), see id. § 556(b) (2012), limiting ex parte communications, and limiting the 
ALJs’ functions within the agency, see id. § 554(d). 
 13 RAYMOND LIMON, OFFICE OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUDICIARY THEN AND NOW — A DECADE OF CHANGE 1992–2002, app. C (2002). Limon’s 
data from 2002 is the most recent data of which I am aware concerning AJs and their 
proceedings. I am not aware of any data (contemporary to data concerning the 
number of AJ proceedings) for ALJs. For limited, dated numbers, see infra note 40 and 
accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.  
 15 See LIMON, supra note 13, at app. C (“2002 Top Ten List of Non-ALJs by 
Agency”). 
 16 See infra notes 43–53 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra Part I.B. 
 18 See infra Part I. 
 19 Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1345. 
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The key problem with all agency hearings — whether with an ALJ 
or AJ — is that they create inherent partiality concerns. The 
adjudicator’s employing agency is often a party and controls the 
adjudicator’s budget and perhaps salary. Indeed, the agency may even 
present expert witnesses who are the adjudicator’s own co-workers.20 
Congress sought to address these concerns in the APA for ALJs by 
giving ALJs independence based on their hiring, removal, oversight, 
and limited interactions with agency officials.21 Yet even with the 
APA’s many ALJ-independence measures, scholars have questioned 
ALJs’ appearance of partiality for decades, coming to different 
conclusions as to whether ALJs violate due process.22 But Congress 
has not given AJs any of these indicia of independence, even after the 
well-publicized partisan hiring and firing of Immigration Judges (a 
type of AJ) during the George W. Bush Administration.23 Yet if, as the 
recent SEC example and past scholarship reveal, the federal 
government’s most formal form of adjudication with its most 
independent agency judges (ALJs) is problematic,24 the use of less 
independent AJs in less litigant-protective proceedings is even more 
troubling. Any solutions that focus only on ALJs are myopic because 
more significant and pernicious problems surround AJs. This Article 
tackles AJs’ place in the administrative state and thereby agency 
adjudication much more broadly. 
 
 20 Moliterno, supra note 3, at 1195.  
 21 See infra notes 219, 221 and accompanying text. Congress has also given certain 
AJs — Board of Contracts Appeals Judges — some or all of the protections that ALJs 
have. For instance, all of those judges must be appointed like ALJs from a register by 
the hiring agency. See 41 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(1), (b)(2), (c)(2), (d)(2) (2012); VERKUIL 
ET AL., supra note 3, at 950-51. One group also has the same protection from at-will 
removal that ALJs share. See 41 U.S.C. § 7105(a) (no protection from at-will removal 
for Armed Services Board Judges); id. § 7105(b)(3) (same protection as ALJs from at-
will removal for Civil Board of Contract Appeals Judge); id. § 7105(c) (no protection 
for Tennessee Valley Authority Board Judges), (d) (no protection from at-will removal 
for Postal Service Board Judges).  
 22 See Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, supra note 3, at 817-20 (summarizing 
due-process debates surrounding ALJs). 
 23 See, e.g., Donald S. Dobkin, The Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription for 
Lawlessness, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 362, 380-81 (2008) (citing Carol Marin, 
Patronage “Crime” Does Pay — for Justice Dept., CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, at B6); 
Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Immigration Judges Often Picked Based on GOP Ties, 
WASH. POST, June 11, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/10/AR2007061001229.html. 
 24 See Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, supra note 3, at 816-20 (discussing 
impartiality debates surrounding ALJs in legal scholarship).  
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Agencies, largely ignoring the partiality question, have increasingly 
chosen AJs to preside over oral hearings for several ostensible reasons. 
Proponents argue that agencies can use AJs to oversee less important, 
more flexible, and more efficient proceedings than the formal 
proceedings that the APA requires ALJs to oversee.25 AJs, too, are 
likely to provide more subject-matter and policy expertise than ALJs 
because they come from within the agency and often are working on 
other agency projects.26 Unlike with ALJs, agencies face no statutory 
impediment to controlling AJs’ appointment, job performance, or 
termination. And agencies can obtain all of these indicia of control 
over AJs at a lower cost because AJs’ salaries are purportedly cheaper 
than ALJs’. Because of these benefits, the conventional wisdom holds 
that agencies will and should — from their vantage point — choose 
AJs and informal adjudication over ALJs and formal adjudication.27 
But this Article identifies two examples to demonstrate that the choice 
is not inevitable28 and, at any rate, argues that agencies’ significant 
preference for AJs over ALJs has it backwards. 
Agencies’ control over AJs and purported cost savings exact a 
significant price for three reasons. First and foremost, AJs suffer from 
even more partiality concerns than ALJs because they lack ALJs’ more 
rigorous appointment process led by an outside agency and ALJs’ 
statutory protections from oversight and removal. This is a significant 
problem for regulated parties and agencies because, in light of one of 
the Supreme Court’s most recent impartiality decisions (Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co.29) and one of its most recent separation-of-
powers decisions (Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB30), there is a 
 
 25 See Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s Adjudication 
Provisions to All Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1003, 1009 
(2004) (“[Formal adjudication with ALJs] interferes with an agency’s ability to 
manage its adjudicatory function and increases an agency’s costs of conducting 
adjudication.”); Frye, supra note 3, at 268 (discussing agencies’ view that informality 
improves agency control and efficiency of achieving policy goals that Congress has set 
for the agency). 
 26 See Frye, supra note 3, at 350-51 (noting that of the 2,692 AJs reported in the 
1992 Frye Survey, more than 2,000 (including those who do not work for agencies) 
perform other tasks for the agency or employer); Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial 
Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, app. I 
(2007) (“In addition to the ALJs, there are many other administrative judges who are 
chosen and appointed within the agencies to positions that may not be full-time or 
permanent.”). 
 27 See infra Part III. 
 28 See infra Part II. 
 29 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 30 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
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compelling, unacknowledged argument that agency control over AJs 
creates an unconstitutional appearance of partiality under the Due 
Process Clause and thereby renders invalid tainted agency 
proceedings. Moreover, even without a due process violation, the 
perception of partiality — as the SEC’s current litigation demonstrates 
— leads to wholesale resistance from regulated parties and perhaps 
even courts (as partiality concerns over Immigration Judges did in the 
mid-2000s) and Congress for agency initiatives. Second, using AJs, 
instead of ALJs and formal adjudication, decreases the likelihood 
under current doctrine that agencies will receive deference from courts 
(under administrative law’s well-known Chevron doctrine) when they 
interpret statutes that they administer. Third, using AJs, instead of 
ALJs, is less likely to limit onerous agency litigation because the latter 
receive absolute official immunity as a matter of course, while the 
former must satisfy an uncertain, open-ended inquiry. 
Aside from the perils of agency control over AJs, the other benefits for 
AJs — cost savings, informality, and better expertise — are exaggerated. 
The cost savings of using AJs is not as significant as it may first appear 
because approximately half of all AJs make more than, the same as, or 
almost as much as ALJs.31 Even when assuming the greatest (and 
unrealistic) pay differential between ALJs and the remaining AJs, the 
cost savings is small — almost always less than $3 million per agency 
(out of multi-million- or multi-billion-dollar budgets). Likewise, the 
value of informality is also overstated. Many AJ proceedings are 
relatively formal already, and formal adjudication with ALJs under the 
APA provides more flexibility than its name suggests, leaving only an 
extremely small number of cases in which formal adjudication would be 
ill-suited.32 Finally, significant technical expertise is not always 
necessary for agency adjudication. But when it is, the administrative 
state can allow agencies to consider expertise when hiring ALJs, while 
mitigating concerns that agencies will hire only their own employees 
with certain biases. In short, agencies have overstated the benefits and 
understated the costs of choosing AJs over ALJs.33 
The purpose of this Article is threefold. First, it seeks to highlight 
and contextualize the often-forgotten hearing officers who preside 
over hundreds of thousands of federal adjudications. Second, it seeks 
to convince agencies that they should not accept the seemingly 
intuitive benefits of using AJs without much deeper consideration, 
 
 31 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 32 But even these few proceedings should have AJs with increased indicia of 
independence for the reasons provided infra Part IV. 
 33 See infra Part IV. 
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especially in light of new doctrine since the early 1990s when informal 
adjudication received its last meaningful glance from scholars. Third, 
it seeks to reorient the largely forgotten discussion of AJs from the 
1990s by shifting the focus from when Congress should require the use 
of ALJs for the sake of regulated parties34 to how agencies themselves 
have discretion and incentive to choose AJs or, when necessary, seek 
congressional authorization to do so. 
Two caveats apply. First, this Article does not take a view on when 
an oral hearing is necessary or appropriate.35 Instead, this Article 
addresses whether ALJs and statutory formalities better serve agency 
interests once Congress or an agency has determined that one is 
needed. Second, it does not address how ALJs and formal proceedings 
could be further improved to avoid the SEC’s predicament. Notably, 
ALJs provide no panacea. But I have considered that question, in part, 
elsewhere,36 and its full treatment requires more space than this 
Article permits. 
With these goals and limitations in mind, this Article proceeds as 
follows. Part I distinguishes ALJs from AJs, concentrating on their 
appointment, removal, and protections from agency influence and 
control. Part II considers agencies’ significant discretion in choosing 
who presides over agency hearings, and Part III describes why 
agencies have reflexively chosen AJs over ALJs. Part IV argues that 
agencies should choose ALJs over AJs to further agencies’ own 
interests by highlighting the overlooked costs of controlling AJs, the 
benefits of ALJs, and the overstated arguments for AJs. 
 
 34 See, e.g., VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1058 (“Congress should consider 
expanding the category of cases where ALJs are required . . . .”). 
 35 For a leading discussion of when informal adjudication proceedings satisfy due 
process, see Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 739, 779-93 (1976) [hereinafter Informal Adjudication]. Scholars have also more 
recently reconsidered the virtues of formal administrative proceedings. See also, e.g., 
William Funk, The Rise and Purported Demise of Wong Yang Sung, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 
881, 884 (2006) [hereinafter Wong Yang Sung] (reconsidering the viability of early 
Supreme Court decision evaluating when Congress requires formal adjudication “on 
the record” under the APA); Aaron Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 237, 292 (2014) (calling for agencies and Congress to reevaluate the benefits 
of formal rulemaking with oral hearings). 
 36 See generally Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, supra note 3 (identifying 
three constitutional and practical concerns that surround ALJs and arguing that ALJs’ 
appointment and removal by the D.C. Circuit would largely mitigate those concerns). 
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I. DISTINGUISHING ALJS FROM AJS 
ALJs and AJs outnumber and handle a substantially larger caseload 
than Article III judges. Although there are 860 permanently 
authorized Article III judgeships as of 2014,37 there are more than 
1,500 ALJs38 and, based on the latest data from 2002, more than 3,300 
AJs.39 Along with their substantially greater numbers, ALJs and AJs 
decide a large number of cases, likely more than federal courts. Based 
on historical data, AJs and ALJs together likely preside, at the least, 
over more than 750,000 proceedings annually.40 For comparison’s 
sake, federal district courts had only about 375,000 civil and criminal-
felony case filings in 2015.41 
ALJs and AJs perform the same kinds of duties as their Article III 
analogues, although those duties vary by agency or proceeding.42 In 
general, they preside over hearings, admit evidence and compile a 
record of the proceedings, make credibility determinations, and issue 
initial opinions.43 They also often have authority to assess monetary 
penalties44 or revoke valuable licenses45 or security clearances.46 Aside 
from or while adjudicating factual disputes, they also make social 
policy by interpreting statutes, agency regulations, and agency 
 
 37 Authorized Judgeships, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/ 
authorized-judgeships (last visited July 11, 2015) (click “Authorized Judgeships- 
From 1789 to Present”). 
 38 See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 40 LIMON, supra note 13, at 4 (noting that AJs presided over approximately 
393,000 proceedings in 1992); Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1346 n.18 (noting 
that ALJs decided over 250,000 cases in 1990). 
 41 See Table N/A — U.S. District Courts — Combined Civil and Criminal Federal 
Court Management Statistics, U.S. COURTS (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.uscourts. 
gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-management-statistics/2015/03/31-2. 
 42 For empirical data from the early 1990s concerning the kinds of proceedings 
and matters that AJs oversee and consider, see Frye, supra note 3, at 263-69. 
 43 See Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco — A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 71 
(1979); Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1345. 
 44 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77h–1(g) (2012) (permitting ALJs to award civil penalties 
in SEC enforcement proceedings); Frye, supra note 3, at 283 (discussing informal 
adjudications in Coast Guard); id. at 287 n.65 (discussing certain informal EPA and 
FDIC enforcement proceedings).  
 45 See, e.g., Frye, supra note 3, at 287 n.65 (discussing license-revocation 
proceedings by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms); id. at 308-14 
(considering administrative cases in which the remedies or licensing apparatuses 
primarily benefit private parties).  
 46 See id. at 279-80 (discussing security-clearance revocation hearings by the 
Directorate for Industrial Security Clearance Review).  
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guidance documents47 and by compiling a record necessary to support 
policy decisions.48 
The hearings that they oversee may concern exceedingly similar 
subject matters. For instance, both ALJs and AJs award entitlement 
benefits. ALJs award social-security benefits, while AJs award veterans 
benefits.49 Likewise, ALJs preside over MSPB disciplinary hearings 
concerning other ALJs, but AJs oversee those same hearings for all 
other federal employees.50 
Unsurprisingly, because of AJs’ and ALJs’ shared functions, similar 
hearings, and nearly identical titles and acronyms, they are frequently 
confused with one another or treated as if they are nearly 
synonymous. Some scholars consciously group them together when 
addressing concerns about administrative adjudication generally.51 
Others seem to group them together inadvertently, although 
understandably.52 Yet, as compared to their functional similarities, AJs 
and ALJs differ in ways that are less obvious to litigants: their number 
and potential employers, appointment, removal, and ability to resist 
agency oversight. 
 
 47 See Charles Koch, Jr., Administrative Judges’ Role in Developing Social Policy, 68 
LA. L. REV. 1095, 1100-01 (2008) (explaining how administrative judges’ 
interpretations can aid in the development of rules and policy). 
 48 See id. at 1099 (“[Adjudicators’ ability to develop the record] is one of the ways 
administrative adjudication is superior to other forms, especially in confronting policy 
issues. Administrative judges must ensure that the record contains the necessary 
technical and other policy oriented information, what administrative law defines as 
‘legislative facts.’”); see also id. at 1102-03 (“Administrative judges serve the policy-
making function as both record builders and initial decision-makers. . . . The agency 
must develop policy that carries forward the intent of the statute, and administrative 
judges should contribute to that policy development.”). 
 49 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 92–7: THE FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 3 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 ACUS RPT.], available at 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/92-7.pdf. 
 50 See Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1352 n.47 (noting that Congress 
specifically permitted the use of AJs, except in hearings concerning ALJs). 
 51 See Koch, Policymaking, supra note 3, at 701 n.40. 
 52 Robert J. McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind: Answers for Federal Whistleblowers, 3 
WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 184, 215 n.207 (2012) [hereinafter Blowing in the Wind] 
(citing an article in a leading law journal that purported to examine bias in 
“administrative law judges,” but referred to U.S. Department of Labor statistics that 
grouped “administrative law judges, adjudicators, and hearing officers” together). 
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A. Administrative Law Judges 
As of 2010, there were nearly 1,600 federal ALJs, more than 1,300 of 
whom work for the Social Security Administration (“SSA”).53 Their 
positions are established by statute.54 Agencies may appoint them55 but 
only after the OPM has winnowed a list of candidates. ALJ candidates 
must be licensed attorneys, have seven years’ litigation experience in 
courts or administrative agencies (but not necessarily in matters 
related to the hiring agency), and pass an examination that the OPM 
administers.56 The OPM then ranks candidates based on examination 
scores, experience,57 and veteran status.58 The OPM then prepares, 
under what is known as the “Rule of Three,” a list of the three highest-
scoring candidates from which the appointing agency can select its 
ALJ.59 The goal of this OPM-led process is to render the appointments 
nonpolitical.60 To obtain more control over the appointment process, 
agencies often hire ALJs who already work in another agency,61 or 
they can wait until several vacancies exist to obtain a larger register of 
candidates.62 Agencies may also borrow an ALJ from another agency 
with that agency’s consent.63 
 
 53 See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 586 app. C (2010) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the OPM informed the Court that there were 1,584 federal 
ALJs, 1,334 of whom work for the SSA).  
 54 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012). 
 55 Id. (“Each agency shall appoint as many administrative law judges as are 
necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with sections 556 
and 557 of this title.”). 
 56 VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: AN 
OVERVIEW 2 (2010). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Veterans’ Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3309 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 302.201 (2015). 
For a discussion on the significant impact of the controversial veterans’ preference on 
the final list of ALJ candidates, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law 
Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 115-16 (1981) 
[hereinafter Federal Administrative Law Judges]. The Administrative Conference of the 
United States has recommended repeatedly that Congress modify the preference 
because it further limits agencies in hiring candidates with relevant skills or expertise. 
See 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 49, at 6. 
 59 See BURROWS, supra note 56, at 2-3. The OPM’s scoring formulation for veterans 
led to protracted litigation and the suspension of ALJ hiring for four years. See Meeker 
v. M.S.P.B., 319 F.3d 1368, 1370-72 (Fed. Cir. 2003); BURROWS, supra note 56, at 3. 
 60 Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1344. 
 61 See id. at 1361 n.82. 
 62 See 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 49, at 5. 
 63 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (2012). 
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After their appointment, ALJs have some statutory protection from 
agency oversight to protect their decisional independence. ALJs 
oversee rulemaking or adjudicatory hearings that Congress requires to 
be “on the record.”64 This on-the-record phrase triggers “formal 
adjudication,” as it is colloquially known,65 with certain rights and 
protections under the APA.66 One of the key characteristics of formal 
hearings is that the agency heads67 or an ALJ must preside.68 When an 
ALJ presides (as is almost always the case69), the APA requires a 
separation of functions for ALJs, meaning that they cannot perform 
investigative or prosecutorial functions or report to an employee who 
does.70 They also generally cannot have ex parte contacts (including 
with agency officials) concerning a fact at issue.71 But heads of 
agencies can still set agency policy by reversing ALJs’ decisions in full, 
as to both fact and law.72 
ALJs, too, have significant protection from performance reviews. 
They are exempt from the Civil Service Reform Act’s performance 
appraisal requirements, which apply to most federal employees.73 
Their pay is set by statute and OPM regulation, not tied to 
performance reviews.74 Agencies also cannot reward ALJs with 
 
 64 Id. § 553(c) (2012) (rulemaking); id. § 554(a) (2012) (adjudication). There is a 
longstanding debate over whether the SSA, which uses ALJs for its hearings, is 
required to engage in formal adjudication for its hearings. See Social Security 
Subcommittee House Ways and Means Committee 4-5 (June 27, 2012) (statement of 
Professor Jeffrey S. Lubbers); Robin J. Arzt, Adjudications by Administrative Law Judges 
Pursuant to the Social Security Act Are Adjudications Pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 22 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 279, 281-82 (2002) [hereinafter 
Adjudications]. One of the SSA’s ALJs has asserted that ALJs are permitted to oversee 
only formal proceedings. See id. 
 65 Asimow, supra note 25, at 1005-06 (noting that some “informal” proceedings 
can be equally as “formal” as those that are not governed by the APA’s on-the-record 
requirements). 
 66 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (2012). 
 67 Id. § 556(b)(1)–(2) (permitting an agency head or members of a multi-member 
body to preside). 
 68 Id. § 556(b)(3). 
 69 Asimow, supra note 25, at 1005 n.11 (“The APA also permits the agency head 
or heads to preside at hearings instead of ALJs (although this almost never 
happens).”). 
 70 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d)(2), 3105 (2012); Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in 
Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 346 (1991) (describing separation of 
functions for ALJs). 
 71 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1). 
 72 Id. § 557(b) (2012); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495 (1951). 
 73 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 49, at 2.  
 74 Id.; see also Harold J. Krent, Presidential Control of Adjudication Within the 
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bonuses.75 Agencies do have some authority to implement quality-
control mechanisms to improve efficiency and accuracy in the 
adjudicative process.76 Yet, despite some scholarly support,77 these 
mechanisms have proven controversial and of limited use in removing 
less productive ALJs.78 
Agencies, too, have a circumscribed ability to discipline and remove 
ALJs. They may generally discipline or remove ALJs only for “good 
cause established and determined by the [MSPB]” after a formal 
administrative hearing.79 The MSPB members, like ALJs, also enjoy 
protection from removal because the President can remove them “only 
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”80 Otherwise, 
ALJs essentially have life tenure because they do not serve for a period 
of years in office.81 That said, ALJs are quick to note that agencies have 
sought to remove more than twenty ALJs since 1946, and the SSA — 
which employs most ALJs — has sought to obtain authority to 
“discipline” ALJs for “offenses” without prior findings by the MSPB.82 
B. Administrative Judges 
With ALJs’ place in the administrative firmament in mind, the 
differences between AJs and ALJs become readily apparent. But as an 
initial admonition, one key reason that AJs remain the most unknown 
 
Executive Branch, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1083, 1108 (2015) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 4301 
(2012)). ALJs’ pay is set out in significant detail in 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2012), with three 
levels of basic pay. Notably, Congress moved from a two-tiered pay grade for ALJs — 
which was supposed to account for the difficulty of the kinds of cases that ALJs heard, 
see Scalia, supra note 43, at 65-67, and raised their pay. See Verkuil, Reflections, supra 
note 3, at 1352. 
 75 See 5 C.F.R. § 930.210(b) (2015) (OPM regulation). 
 76 See Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 402, 405-06 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(holding that ALJs could not assert a claim to invalidate the SSA’s current 500-
decision “goal” under the APA, but instead had to seek relief under the Civil Service 
Reform Act); Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 680 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding SSA’s 
implementation of “reasonable production goals”). 
 77 See Pierce, Political Control, supra note 3, at 506. 
 78 See Colvin, 777 F.3d at 402 (ALJ Association challenging SSA’s disposition 
“goals”); Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321 (1984) (refusing to remove 
ALJ with productivity rate more than 50% below agency average of monthly case 
dispositions). For a thorough discussion of productivity-related actions against ALJs, 
see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an Appropriate 
System of Performance Evaluation for ALJs, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 589 (1994). 
 79 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012). 
 80 Id. § 1202(d) (2012). 
 81 See Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1344. 
 82 See Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, supra note 3, at 808. 
  
2016] Against Administrative Judges 1657 
of the “hidden judiciary” is that the data for AJs, as compared to ALJs 
is much more limited, dated, and inconsistent from survey to survey. 
Because the government does not regularly collect data on AJs, 
surveyors must “go directly to the employing agencies.”83 
Most of the data in this Article comes from either a 1992 survey 
collected by Administrative Law Judge John Frye concerning AJs 
(hereinafter, 1992 Frye Survey)84 or a 2002 (and most recent) update 
by Raymond Limon, then Acting Assistant Deputy Director at the 
OPM’s Office of Administrative Law Judges (hereinafter, Limon 
Updated Survey).85 These surveys asked numerous agencies similar 
questions about the number of AJs who preside over oral hearings, 
AJs’ titles, AJs’ pay grade or scale, how agencies review AJs’ 
performance (if at all), and types of cases that AJs hear.86 But, likely 
because of statutory changes or responding agencies’ differing 
interpretations of the questions asked, responses from the agencies to 
these similar questions, at times, provided disparate answers. For 
instance, the respondents appear to have interpreted who qualified as 
a “non-ALJ” or what qualified as an “oral hearing” differently. The 
1992 Frye Survey reports Veterans Affairs (“VA”) regional 
administrators as the largest group of federal AJs, but the VA did not 
include them in its response in the Limon Updated Survey.87 Likewise, 
the Limon Updated Survey reported that the Commerce and Treasury 
departments housed the most AJs with 1,000 patent examiners and 
950 IRS AJs, respectively, but neither appeared to count these 
positions in the 1992 Frye Survey.88 Moreover, some agencies 
responded to one study but not the other.89 Unless identified 
otherwise, I rely upon the Limon Updated Survey data because it is 
more recent, was sent to more agencies,90 and received more 
responses.91 
 
 83 LIMON, supra note 13, at app. B n.1. 
 84 See generally Frye, supra note 3. 
 85 See generally LIMON, supra note 13. 
 86 See id. app. B (“2002 Survey Questions of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs”); Frye, 
supra note 3, app. A, at 348 (“Study of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs”). 
 87 Compare Frye, supra note 3, app. B at 351 (listing 1,692 VA AJs), with LIMON, 
supra note 13, app. C, at 6 (listing total number of 306 AJs at the VA). 
 88 Compare LIMON, supra note 13, app. C, at 1, 6 (listing total number of 1,097 AJs at 
Commerce and 950 at Treasury), with Frye, supra note 3, app. B, at 349-51 (listing 58 
AJs for Commerce (including the Board of Patent Appeals) and 21 for Treasury AJs). 
 89 Compare LIMON, supra note 13, at 2 (noting that surveys were sent to “over 80 
Federal agencies”) & app. C (listing agencies that responded to surveys), with Frye, 
supra note 3, app. A at 347 (listing surveyed agencies and those that responded). 
 90 Compare LIMON, supra note 13, at 2 (“[W]e eventually contacted over 80 
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These concerns with the data’s validity are important to keep in 
mind, but they affect my analysis in only one minor way. The data’s 
primary purpose is to establish the general widespread use and variety 
of AJs. I have no reason to think that more contemporary data, other 
than revealing more use and variety of AJs, would undermine these 
descriptive points. Any specific data is largely irrelevant to my key 
points concerning partiality, formality, or expertise. The only area that 
the data’s limitations may slightly impact my conclusions is in the 
magnitude of cost savings from using AJs. Because the number of AJs 
is probably greater now than in 2002, the cost savings may be slightly 
greater than I indicate in Part IV.B.1. Nonetheless, it is extremely 
likely that my larger point — that the cost savings are not as large as 
they first appear based on AJs’ various salaries and agencies’ relative 
budgets — continues to be true, and I attempted to address concerns 
over the data’s limits by assuming the best case for agencies’ cost 
savings when interpreting the most current data. 
From the existing data, AJs and ALJs differ in number and potential 
employers. Based on the most recent data, the number of AJs is likely 
more than double that of ALJs.92 The Limon Updated Survey reveals 
that of the reported 3,370 AJs in 2002, almost one-third worked for 
the Department of Commerce, most as patent examiners.93 The next 
largest category from the Limon Updated Report is 950 AJs for the 
Internal Revenue Service.94 In the 1992 Frye Survey (but not included 
 
Federal agencies and offices . . . .”), with Frye, supra note 3, app. A (listing 48 agencies 
to which surveys were sent). 
 91 Compare LIMON, supra note 13, app. C (listing 65 agencies responding and 36 
indicating that they administered responsive hearings), with Frye, supra note 3, app. A 
(listing 47 agencies as responding and 35 indicating that they administered responsive 
hearings). The 1992 Frye Study is helpful, however, in describing how AJs frequently 
engage in more activities than adjudication and in identifying how some AJs are not 
government employees. See id. app. B. 
 92 Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1345-46 (noting, in 1989, that 2,600 AJs 
worked for the federal government fulltime or part-time, rendering the corps of AJs 
“about twice as large as the ALJ corps . . . [with] a decision load that is at least the 
magnitude of that carried by the ALJs”); Frye, supra note 3, at 270 n.20 (noting that 
there were “601 presiding officers without other duties . . . [and] some 2,262 
presiding officers with other duties, including those who are not government 
employees”). Limon also reported 1,351 ALJs in 2002. LIMON, supra note 13, at 3 n.4. 
 93 See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C, at 1 & “2002 Top Ten List of Non-ALJs by 
Agency” Chart.  
 94 See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C, at 6. The 1992 Frye Survey did not include 
these IRS AJs. See Frye, supra note 3, app. B, at 349-51 (reporting only 21 AJs for the 
Department of Treasury). 
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in the Limon Updated Survey95), the second largest group of AJs is 
comprised of privately employed hearing officers who adjudicate 
certain Medicare disputes that health insurers administer for the 
government.96 These 185 AJs reveal a key difference between some AJs 
and ALJs. Unlike all ALJs, these Medicare hearing officers are part of a 
slightly larger group of 237 AJs, as reported in 1992, who are 
employed by private parties, not government agencies.97 
Insurance-carrier “hearing officers” reveal another, and much less 
appreciated, difference between ALJs and AJs: the nature of their titles 
is not the same. “Administrative Law Judge” is a statutory term, as 
indicated above, that applies to those OPM-approved adjudicators who 
have statutory protections and preside over formal adjudication.98 AJs, 
in contrast, can, but rarely do, have a statutorily provided title. For 
example, Congress expressly used the term “administrative judge” in 
describing the initial adjudicators of certain civil-penalty hearings 
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty99 and adverse actions 
concerning senior executives within the VA.100 Congress also provides 
similar titles, such as “Immigration Judges,” defined as those 
“attorney[s] whom the Attorney General appoints as an administrative 
judge within the Executive Office of Immigration Review.”101 Much 
more frequently, however, the agency establishes the term by 
regulation.102 In yet other instances, “AJ” or “administrative judge” is a 
 
 95 See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C, at 3 (not listing Carrier Hearing Officers 
under entry for “U.S. Department of Health & Human Services”). 
 96 See Frye, supra note 3, at 291, app. B, at 349-52. 
 97 See id. at 351-52. The Limon Updated Survey does not appear to include 
privately employed AJs, aside from a response from the Administrative Office of the 
Courts, which indicated that it uses AJs on a contractual basis and listed the pay plan 
as “N/A.” See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C, at 1. For this reason, I generally limit my 
discussion to government-employed AJs. 
 98 See LIMON, supra note 13, at 2 n.2 (“[O]nly ALJs appointed under 5 U.S.C. 3105 
may be given the title of ALJ.”). 
 99 See 22 U.S.C. § 8142(a)(2)–(3) (2012). 
 100 38 U.S.C. § 713(e) (2012) (removal of senior executives within Department of 
Veterans Affairs). The U.S. Code makes a few other references to “administrative 
judges.” See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aaa–6(h)(2), 450f(e)(2)(B) (2012) (relating to 
hearings concerning, respectively, funding for Indian-health programs and Indian-
tribe self-determination agreements). 
 101 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012). 
 102 See LIMON, supra note 13, at 2 n.2 (“Generally, individual agencies may create 
their own job titles for personnel, budget and fiscal purposes.”); see also, e.g., 29 
C.F.R. § 1614.109(a) (2015) (permitting the EEOC to appoint “administrative 
judge[s]” to conduct hearings); 10 C.F.R. § 710.25(a)–(b) (2015) (requiring 
appointment of an “Administrative Judge” for certain Department of Energy hearings); 
12 C.F.R. § 268.108 (2015) (having General Counsel of the Department of Defense 
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catch-all term that scholars use to describe those who oversee agency 
hearings (sometimes including ALJs103),104 whatever their title.105 For 
my purposes, I use the term “AJ” to refer to all non-ALJs who oversee 
oral hearings. 
Agencies appoint agency-employed AJs without any outside agency’s 
(such as the OPM’s) involvement in the selection process.106 Agencies 
often have established guidelines for selecting AJs as part of a 
competitive process for AJs who have no other duties.107 For instance, 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires that hearing examiners 
“shall be from a list of qualified attorneys possessing the highest 
degree of integrity, ability, and good judgment”; have certain 
authorization; be employed by the agency, or one of its licensees or 
contractors that are not parties to the hearing; have no ex parte 
knowledge of the proceedings; and otherwise be impartial.108 But 
agencies are not generally required by any statute or the U.S. 
Constitution to be appointed in a particular way or to have any 
particular qualifications (such as being a lawyer109), aside from Civil 
Service statutes that apply to hiring generally.110 Indeed, the Bush 
administration came under fire for appointing Immigration Judges 
(“IJs”) — a category of AJs — based on political criteria, instead of 
under a competitive process.111 Half of the 37 hired IJs had no 
 
appoint “attorneys to be Administrative Judges assigned to the Defense Office of 
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) and DOHA Appeal Board”). 
 103 See Koch, Policymaking, supra note 3, at 701 n.40 (noting distinction between 
ALJs and AJs under federal statutory law but “adopt[ing] ‘administrative judge’ as a 
universal term” for his article). 
 104 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 49, at 1; Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1342 
(“The second category is far more amorphous, but can still be distinguished from 
‘non-hearing’ deciders. The deciders in this category are frequently called 
‘administrative judges’ or ‘hearing examiners.’”). 
 105 See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 10.26 (2015) (permitting the appointment of a Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission “Hearing Examiner” from qualified list of attorneys); 33 
C.F.R. § 1.07-15 (2015) (referring to Coast Guard “hearing officers”). 
 106 Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1347 (“The selection and appointment 
procedures for administrative judges are controlled by the agencies themselves.”). 
 107 See Frye, supra note 3, at 272. Frye notes that some of the respondents to his 
survey appeared to interpret his question as one concerning how employees are hired 
generally. See id. (describing AJs with no other duties); id. at 274 (describing AJs with 
other duties). 
 108 See 10 C.F.R. § 10.26 (2015). 
 109 The Limon Updated Survey indicates that 2,000 of the 3,370 AJs are not 
attorneys. See LIMON, supra note 13, at 4; see also Frye, supra note 3, app. B 
(identifying AJs who are and are not lawyers). 
 110 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2302 (2012). 
 111 See Susan Benesch, Due Process and Decisionmaking in U.S. Immigration 
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immigration experience, and those with experience had all worked in 
enforcement or as prosecutor.112 And because many AJs have 
additional duties aside from presiding over hearings,113 agencies may 
have a freer and less visible hand in selecting employees to serve as 
part-time adjudicators. 
Once appointed, AJs have less independence than ALJs from their 
agency-employers. Unlike ALJs, most AJs (83%) are subject to 
performance appraisals within the agency,114 and “several major 
groups of AJs [regularly] undergo such appraisals.”115 Those appraisals 
can affect their salaries, which can be less than ALJs.116 No statute 
prohibits them, unlike ALJs, from receiving pay bonuses from their 
agencies. Also unlike ALJs, AJs are not entitled to any particular 
protection from removal from office (such as ALJs’ “good cause” 
standard of removal).117 Hidden, subtle pressures on AJs to rule in 
certain ways — to obtain favorable agency appraisals — often go 
unremarked.118 
Agencies may also have a greater ability to influence AJ proceedings 
directly. Unlike ALJs who oversee formal proceedings under the APA, 
AJs typically preside over hearings that the APA minimally 
regulates.119 In these proceedings (often referred to as “informal” 
adjudications), the APA’s prohibitions concerning separation of 
 
Adjudication, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 557, 566 (2007). “An immigration judge is ‘an 
attorney whom the Attorney General appoints as an administrative judge within the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4). The [OPM] has 
categorized career attorney positions as Schedule A. 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102. All IJs are 
career Schedule A appointees. Consequently, the civil service laws set forth at 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 2301 and 2302 apply to the appointment of IJs.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN 
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER 
STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (2008), available at 
https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0807/chapter6.htm. 
 112 See Benesch, supra note 111, at 566. 
 113 See Frye, supra note 3, at 274 (noting lack of information on how presiding 
officers with other duties were selected to be arbitrators). 
 114 See LIMON, supra note 13, at 4. 
 115 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 49, at 2. 
 116 See McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind, supra note 52, at 215. See discussion infra 
Part IV.B.1 for more detailed discussion of salaries. 
 117 See McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind, supra note 52, at 217 (referring to IJs and 
MSPB AJs) (citing Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Closing Remarks, Holes in the Fence: Immigration 
Reform and Border Security in the United States, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 621, 627 (2007)). 
 118 See, e.g., id. at 217-23 (arguing that MSPB AJs are biased). 
 119 One exception appears to concern enforcement of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, where the implementing statute provides that AJs shall conduct 
hearings under 5 U.S.C. § 554, the formal-adjudication triggering provision under the 
APA. 22 U.S.C. § 8142(a)(2)–(a)(3) (2012).  
  
1662 University of California, Davis [Vol. 49:1643 
functions and ex parte communications do not apply.120 That said, 
agencies may have prohibitions concerning ex parte communications 
via rule, decision, or tradition.121 Agencies, too, may have some 
express separation of functions simply by limiting AJs from engaging 
in, say, prosecutorial decisions.122 Or they may have de facto 
separation by creating a class of AJs whose only duties are to preside 
over hearings123 or by physically separating certain attorneys from 
other agency employees and titling them “administrative judges.”124 
These more informal methods of providing independence, where they 
exist, may be successful in leading AJs themselves to feel as free as 
ALJs from agency pressure.125 But such informal agency protections do 
not exist throughout the administrative state, can be difficult to police, 
and are not beyond an agency’s abolition. 
II. BLACK-TIE OPTIONAL: CHOOSING ALJS OR AJS 
Agencies have significant discretion to determine when to use 
hearings with all of the APA’s formal-adjudication trappings and thus 
ALJs. The APA requires “formal adjudication” — which provides 
certain rights for parties and limitations on the agency — whenever 
the adjudication is “required by statute to be made on the record after 
opportunity for an agency hearing.”126 Agencies, except in rare 
circumstances, must use ALJs for formal adjudication.127 Agencies may 
use AJs for informal adjudication. In the absence of express “on the 
record” language, courts generally find Congress’s directive 
ambiguous and defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of 
whether the hearing must be “on the record” under Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.’s well-known two-step deference regime.128 For 
 
 120 See Frye, supra note 3, at 344. 
 121 See id.  
 122 See id. at 284 (discussing regulations that limit Coast Guard AJs from serving as 
prosecutors, but not prohibiting ex parte communications). 
 123 See id. at 270-71. 
 124 See Verkuil, Informal Adjudication, supra note 35, at 787 (discussing the 
Department of the Interior’s Office of Hearings and Appeals). 
 125 VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1054 (noting that “our empirical survey shows 
that AJs consider themselves just as independent as ALJs”). 
 126 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012); see also id. § 554(a) (2012) (differing, albeit 
immaterially, from § 553 by stating that the adjudication must be “required by statute 
to be determined on the record” (emphasis added)). 
 127 See id. §§ 554(a), 556 (2012). 
 128 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). At 
the first step, the Court asks whether the statute clearly expresses Congress’s intent. If 
so, the court enforces that intent. See id. at 842-43. But if Congress has left a gap or 
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instance, the First Circuit held that the term “public hearing” was 
ambiguous and upheld the reasonableness of the agency’s 
interpretation via informal rulemaking that formal adjudication was 
not required for certain permitting.129 Aside from the Ninth Circuit, all 
circuits give agencies a wide berth to decide whether adjudication 
must be formal.130 
Contrary to popular impression,131 agencies do not always use their 
discretion to choose informal proceedings with AJs. For example, the 
FTC uses formal adjudication, despite the absence of on-the-record 
language in the FTC Act. The FTC Act permits the FTC to adjudicate 
via an administrative “proceeding” when it has “reason to believe 
that . . . any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or 
practice” has occurred.132 In what appears to have gone unnoticed, the 
FTC Act never requires that the proceedings be “on the record,” 
although it mandates that testimony “be reduced to writing” and 
otherwise describes the administrative “hearing” for issuing a cease-
and-desist order.133 The reduction-to-writing requirement for 
testimony seems, at best, ambiguous. It requires a transcription of 
testimony, but it does not otherwise require that the entirety of the 
hearing — motions or other nontestimonial evidence — be included 
in a record, nor does it require an oral hearing for the taking of 
 
ambiguity in the statute for the agency to fill, the Court merely asks at step two whether 
the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. See id. at 843. 
 129 See Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st 
Cir. 2006). 
 130 See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.2, at 710-11 (5th 
ed. 2010) (noting that a D.C. Circuit decision after Chevron that gave agencies the 
ability to decide whether formal adjudication is required “has been followed by a 
veritable flood of similar opinions from many circuits in many contexts”); JOHN M. 
ROGERS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 122 (3d ed. 2012) (“The Dominion Energy decision 
leaves the . . . Ninth Circuit as the only remaining U.S. Court of Appeals that adheres 
to the Seacoast presumption that a hearing requirement, in the context of an 
adjudicatory proceeding, triggers [the APA’s formal protections].”). 
 131 See Funk, Wong Yang Sung, supra note 35, at 892 (“Agencies never choose to 
have adjudication under the APA.”). 
 132 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2012). 
 133 Id. 
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evidence.134 Despite the lack of formal adjudication’s triggering 
language, the FTC has chosen formal adjudication with ALJs.135 
Similarly, the SSA has chosen to use ALJs in the absence of any “on 
the record” language.136 A 1977 amendment to the Act concerning the 
appointment of temporary ALJs converted those temporary ALJs into 
“career-absolute positions as [ALJs].”137 This amendment and 
significant legislative history around the time of the amendment 
suggest that Congress intended the SSA to use ALJs.138 But after 
Chevron and the judiciary’s broad deference to agencies on the 
formality question, it is far from clear that the SSA is required to use 
ALJs or formal adjudication under the APA. After all, legislative 
history to statutory amendments in 1994 states that although the SSA 
uses ALJs, the use of ALJs and formal APA proceedings are “not 
required by law.”139 The SSA’s use of ALJs is all the more striking 
because the ALJs “departed from their traditional association with the 
trial-type process that had been contemplated by APA formal 
adjudication procedures” by presiding over nonadversarial, 
 
 134 Cf. Michael A. Lawrence, Bias in the International Trade Administration: The Need 
for Impartial Decisonmakers in United States Antidumping Proceedings, 26 CASE W. RES. 
J. INT’L L. 1, 24 n.110 (1994) (noting that similar language in the 1930 Tariff Act was 
amended by the Trade Act of 1974 — after United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, 
410 U.S. 224 (1973) — to require “on the record” proceedings). 
 135 See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency 
Decisions, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 799, 837 (2010) (“The [FTC] implements these 
provisions through rulemaking and formal adjudication.”). The FTC is not required to 
use ALJs, even if the implementing Congress was likely to have formal proceedings in 
mind. In Florida East Coast Railway, the Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s 
reasoning that the 1917 Congress that enacted the Esch Act (the statute at issue in 
that case) would have likely considered a “hearing” a more formal affair based on the 
Court’s roughly contemporaneous precedent. See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. 
Co., 410 U.S. 224, 236-37 (1973). The Court held that such an interpretation was 
inconsistent with the APA’s on-the-record requirement, and it noted that Congress did 
not add an on-the-record requirement to the statute when it amended it after the 
APA’s enactment. See id. at 235-37. Likewise, the FTC Act was also enacted during the 
1910s, and it has been amended after the APA’s passage without adding an on-the-
record requirement. 
 136 See Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1349. 
 137 See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 371, 91 Stat. 
1509, 1559 (1977). 
 138 See Jeffrey Scott Wolfe, Are You Willing to Make the Commitment in Writing? The 
APA, ALJs, and SSA, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 203, 235-42 (2002) (discussing the legislative 
history of the SSA and how the 1977 amendments clarified uncertainty as to whether 
ALJs were required). 
 139 See 140 Cong. Rec. H6843 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1994), cited in Arzt, Adjudications, 
supra note 64, at 305 (arguing that the statement in the legislative history was 
“erroneous” and “unresearched gratuitous dictum”). 
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nonlawyer-based hearings in which the ALJs were representing the 
government, the claimant, and serving as impartial decider.140 
The FTC and SSA’s choice to use ALJs under their enabling acts is 
consistent with their separate, but extensive (though not unlimited), 
statutory authority to appoint ALJs. Congress has provided that 
“[e]ach agency shall appoint as many [ALJs] as are necessary for 
proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with sections 556 
and 557 of [title 5].”141 This provision gives the agencies broad 
discretion to determine how many ALJs to appoint, but it also limits 
those appointments to proceedings “required to be” formal. That 
limitation suggests that an agency’s power to appoint ALJs extends 
only to instances in which the statute or agency requires formal 
adjudication, whether Congress unambiguously requires it or the 
agency has found it reasonable under the statute (via Chevron) to do 
so in light of congressional ambiguity or silence on procedure.142 It 
would not extend to instances in which Congress has clearly indicated 
that formal proceedings should not apply, such as with immigration 
proceedings.143 
This often-overlooked agency discretion, even if limited to when 
formality is permitted under an ambiguous statute, is important. 
Others, including the Administrative Conference of the United States 
(“ACUS”), have called for Congress to require agencies, based on 
fairness and administrative uniformity, to use ALJs in more 
 
 140 Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1349. 
 141 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012). 
 142 As another example, an agency may reasonably decide that adjudications should 
be formal, despite the lack of on-the-record language, when Congress uses a 
substantial-evidence standard of review over certain “hearings,” see 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1234a(c)–(d)(1) (2012), and requires the agency to appoint ALJs to preside over 
those determinations, see id. § 1234(b) (requiring the Secretary of Education to 
appoint ALJs under 5 U.S.C. § 3105 and preside over certain hearings, including those 
under § 1234a, which does not specifically require on-the-record hearings). 
 143 The predecessor agency to the OPM initially refused to create a register of SSA 
ALJs because it did not think that SSA hearings had to be formal. See Wolfe, supra 
note 138, at 213 (citing STAFF OF COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 93D CONG., REPORT ON THE 
DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 55 (1974), microfilmed on CIS No. H782-29 (Cong. 
Info. Serv.)). The Administrative Conference of the United States, citing its informal 
communications with lawyers at OPM, indicated in a report that the OPM takes the 
position that either the statute or regulation must require formal adjudication before it 
will create a register of ALJ candidates for an agency. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE 
U.S., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: EVALUATING THE STATUS AND 
PLACEMENT OF ADJUDICATORS IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR HEARING PROGRAM 13, 27-29 
(2014) [hereinafter ACUS EEOC RPT.], available at https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/FINAL%20EEOC%20Final%20Report%20%5B3-31-14%5D.pdf. 
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proceedings.144 Congress, much to my chagrin, has shown little 
interest in doing so, even as it chastises agencies when abuses come to 
light.145 Instead, one may be more successful in having agencies 
themselves decide — with their broad statutory discretion — to use 
ALJs for formal hearings. This Article seeks to identify first why 
agencies are generally thought to prefer AJs and why their preference 
may not be as beneficial as presupposed. 
III. THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW OF AJS’ BENEFITS 
Agencies nearly always choose AJs over ALJs. As Paul Verkuil 
concisely explained, “[T]hey are opting for a decider who has less 
decisional independence, lower pay and benefits, and less job 
security.”146 Notably, these characteristics (as well as agencies’ 
freedom to appoint AJs147) all point to the same benefit for agencies — 
control.148 From agencies’ viewpoint, control permits them to 
influence agency policy and render proceedings, guided by employees 
 
 144 ACUS had recommended that Congress require formal adjudication for cases 
concerning “substantial impact on personal liberties or freedom,” “criminal-like 
culpability,” “sanctions with substantial economic effect,” or findings of 
discrimination. 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 49, at 12; see also VERKUIL ET AL., supra 
note 3, at 1058 (“Congress should consider expanding the category of cases where 
ALJs are required . . . .”); McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind, supra note 52, at 226 (“One 
way around biased administrative judges would be to adopt the recommendation of 
the ACUS Report in letter as well as spirit, and mandate the use of independent federal 
administrative law judges, rather than administrative judges or hearing examiners, in 
any case where there is a substantial risk of deprivation of life, liberty, or property 
(including job tenure), and also for non-tenured whistleblower removals.”). 
 145 See Asimow, supra note 25, at 1008-09 (“It is unlikely, however, that Congress 
will be persuaded to [require agencies to use ALJs] in the foreseeable future. The 
reason is that agencies strongly resist being required to utilize ALJs, whether in newly 
adopted or existing hearing schemes.”); Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1351 
(writing contemporaneously with the 1992 ACUS Report, calling for congressional 
action). Congress did respond with hearings when the IJs were hired on partisan 
grounds. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text. 
 146 Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1347. 
 147 See id.; see also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity 
Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65, 72 (1996) [hereinafter APA-Adjudication] 
(arguing that AJs have become more populous than ALJs “because of a perception 
that, compared to non-ALJ adjudicators, ALJs are less desirable because of their cost, 
restrictions on their selection, and their effective immunity from performance 
management”). 
 148 See Asimow, supra note 25, at 1020 (“Agencies understandably wish to avoid 
the numerous statutory provisions relating to the hiring, compensation, rotation, 
evaluation, and tenure of ALJs.”). 
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with technical expertise and more interaction with others in the 
agency, more efficient. 
This subsection presents the case for AJs from agencies’ vantage 
point. Part IV responds to AJs’ putative benefits by first identifying the 
overlooked costs of controlling AJs (and concomitantly the benefits of 
choosing independent ALJs) and then contending that AJs’ remaining 
benefits are overstated. 
A. Control, Expertise, and Efficiency 
Control allows agencies to appoint AJs with technical expertise. One 
of the key criticisms of the ALJ-selection process is that agencies have 
little ability to hire ALJs with subject-matter expertise and that the 
ALJs on the OPM’s hiring list frequently have no background in the 
regulatory program for which they will adjudicate.149 But with AJ 
hiring, agencies generally have full authority over deciding who is 
hired,150 and those AJs often come from the agency’s own employee 
ranks.151 Not only is the agency likely to have more information on a 
hired AJ’s suitability for adjudication, but — perhaps most importantly 
— the agency is also better able to ensure that the AJ has expertise in 
the applicable regulatory program.152 To obtain AJs with expertise, 
certain agencies have reported that, at least for those AJs without other 
responsibilities, they provide some form of competitive appointment 
that considers case-management ability, technical expertise, and legal 
knowledge.153 
 
 149 See 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 49, at 5-7 (discussing agencies’ limited 
selection options); Asimow, supra note 25, 1009 (“The [ALJ-selection] process allows 
little room for judgment and discretion, and affords agencies virtually no choice in 
which ALJs to hire. It does not take account of whether a new ALJ has specialized 
experience in the regulatory or beneficiary scheme administered by the agency.”). But 
see Jean Eaglesham, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Criticizes SEC’s In-House Court, WALL 
ST. J., July 15, 2015 [hereinafter In-House Court] (quoting Erin Wirth, president of the 
Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference, as arguing that ALJs are generalists 
who do not need expertise in their fields).  
 150 See Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1347 (“The selection and appointment 
procedures for administrative judges are controlled by the agencies themselves.”). 
 151 Of the 2,692 AJs reported in the 1992 Frye Survey, more than 2,000 (including 
those who do not work for agencies) perform other tasks for the agency. See Frye, 
supra note 3, app. B. 
 152 See Benjamin Kapnik, Affirming the Status Quo?: The FCC, ALJs, and Agency 
Adjudications, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1527, 1545 (2012) (noting that if the FCC 
turned to AJs, instead of ALJs, to improve adjudications, “[t]he FCC would be free, 
however, to hire AJs with subject matter experience, something that ALJs may not 
have”). 
 153 See Frye, supra note 3, at 272; see also id. at 285 (discussing how Coast Guard 
  
1668 University of California, Davis [Vol. 49:1643 
Relatedly, agency control over proceedings encourages more 
efficient decision-making by influencing the ongoing proceeding. First 
and perhaps more importantly for agencies, AJs’ informal hearings 
permit agencies to influence decisions. Because AJs almost always 
preside over hearings that are not “on the record,” the agency is 
neither prohibited by the APA from engaging in ex parte 
communications with the AJ to clarify issues related to a factual 
dispute nor prohibited from having its prosecutorial or investigative 
staff advise the AJ on legal issues,154 unless the Due Process Clause 
limits these interactions in particular scenarios. In other words, from 
the agency’s perspective, the integration of the AJ into the agency 
permits the agency to further its policy goals more efficiently by 
forgoing the usual trappings of independence found in judicial or ALJ 
hearings and rendering less necessary appellate proceedings in which 
the agency overturns the initial decision. Second, AJs are subject to 
performance appraisals that may affect their salaries155 and may permit 
agencies to reward an AJ based on productivity and perhaps 
cooperation with furthering policy objectives. Finally, agencies can 
also remove inefficient or inexpert AJs more easily than ALJs. Unlike 
with ALJs, agencies do not have to obtain the MSPB’s prior consent 
before terminating an AJ’s employment.156 
Aside from separation of functions and ex parte prohibitions, AJ 
proceedings allow procedural innovation and simplicity.157 Agencies 
argue that informality furthers flexibility and efficiency goals.158 
Indeed, Paul Verkuil’s noteworthy study nearly forty years ago 
revealed that agency adjudication varies tremendously in the 
procedures that are followed, even within one agency.159 For instance, 
he noted that the Department of Agriculture has some of the most and 
 
focuses on a hearing officer’s technical knowledge and less on the ability to preside 
over hearings because few hearings occur).  
 154 At least one agency, the MSPB, has sought to create some protection from 
appraisals that overtly or covertly depend on the AJs’ decisions and compliance with 
agency goals by having ALJs conduct the appraisals. See McCarthy, Blowing in the 
Wind, supra note 52, at 216. But this mitigating measure is not universal. 
 155 See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 156 See 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012). 
 157 There are limited exceptions in which non-ALJs can preside over formal 
adjudication. See A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION 199-200 (Jeffrey B. 
Litwak ed., 2012). 
 158 See Frye, supra note 3, at 268 (discussing agencies’ view that informality 
improves agency control and efficiency of achieving policy goals that Congress has set 
for the agency). 
 159 See generally Verkuil, Informal Adjudication, supra note 35. 
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least formal proceedings — as measured by ten characteristics 
mentioned by the Supreme Court in a leading due process decision, 
Goldberg v. Kelly160 — out of four agencies and 42 programs that he 
studied.161 Other agencies’ use of AJs and informal proceedings, as 
compared to formal adjudication under the APA, permit agencies to 
reduce the costs of adjudication and tailor the adjudication to the 
importance of the dispute at hand.162 
B. Purported Lower Costs 
What is more, AJs are purportedly cheaper.163 ALJs’ salaries are set 
by statute and OPM regulations.164 Their current, somewhat complex 
salary system accounts for administrative responsibilities, length of 
federal service, and various exceptional circumstances.165 New ALJs’ 
salary, before any locality or other adjustments,166 is approximately, 
for ease of reference, $106,000.167 ALJs without significant managerial 
 
 160 See id. at 760 & n.80. 
 161 See id. at 775. 
 162 See Asimow, supra note 25, 1009 (“[Formal adjudication with ALJs] interferes 
with an agency’s ability to manage its adjudicatory function and increases an agency’s 
costs of conducting adjudication.”). 
 163 See, e.g., id. (“ALJs are also more highly compensated than most [AJs].”); Robert 
J. McCarthy, Why MSPB Judges Reject 98 Percent of Whistleblower Appeals, FED. LAW., 
Mar. 2013, at 37 [hereinafter MSPB Judges] (“Presumably, the board opted to replace 
ALJs with ‘attorney-examiners’ at least partly to save money, since the more highly 
qualified ALJs make higher salaries than do the board’s attorneys.”). 
 164 See 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2012); Pay & Leave, Pay Administration, Fact Sheet: 
Administrative Law Judge Pay System, OPM.GOV, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
oversight/pay-leave/pay-administration/fact-sheets/administrative-law-judge-pay-
system (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) [hereinafter ALJ Pay Fact Sheet]. 
 165 See ALJ Pay Fact Sheet, supra note 164 (“The ALJ pay system has three levels of 
basic pay: AL-1, AL-2, and AL-3. Pay level AL-3 is the basic pay level for ALJ positions 
filled through competitive examination. Pay level AL-3 has six rates of basic pay: A, B, 
C, D, E, and F. . . . ALJ positions are placed at levels AL-2 and AL-1 when they involve 
significant administrative and managerial responsibilities. . . . [ALJs] must serve at 
least one year in each AL pay level, or in an equivalent or higher level in positions in 
the Federal service, before advancing to the next higher level.”). 
 166 See Pay & Leave, Salaries & Wages, 2015 Locality Rates of Pay, OPM.GOV, 
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/ 
15Tables/exec/html/ALJ_LOC.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2016). The locality 
adjustments can lead to salary increases of more than $30,000 but reach a ceiling of 
$168,700, at all pay levels. See id.  
 167 See Pay & Leave: Salaries & Wages, Salary Table No. 2015-ALJ, OPM.gov, 
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/ 
15Tables/exec/html/ALJ.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) [hereinafter 2015-ALJ Table]. 
  
1670 University of California, Davis [Vol. 49:1643 
responsibilities can earn up to approximately $147,000 based on 2015 
salary tables.168 
In comparison, most AJs’ starting salaries can be significantly lower 
than ALJs’, although the data often fail to provide sufficient specific 
information. The 1992 Frye Survey reported that approximately 91% 
of government-employed AJs were paid according to the general 
service salary table from Grades 9 to 15 (i.e., GS-9 through GS-15).169 
The 2015 starting basic pay rates for these employees vary from 
approximately $42,000 to $102,000 before locality, seniority, or other 
adjustments — all lower than ALJs’ basic starting salaries.170 Likewise, 
the Limon Updated Survey reported that, aside from unique pay 
schedules for certain AJs, pay grades ranged from GS-7 to SES.171 
Nevertheless, as I explain in Part IV.B.1, these savings are not as 
significant as they first appear. 
IV. RULING AGAINST AJS 
This Part critically examines the putative benefits of choosing AJs 
and concludes that, on balance, agencies should choose ALJs over AJs 
to further their own interests. First, it considers the often-overlooked 
benefits of using ALJs that agencies relinquish when prioritizing 
control of AJs over other values. It then considers how AJs’ remaining 
benefits are exaggerated, especially in light of the benefits that ALJs 
provide agencies. Finally, it considers how the administrative state can 
work to give agencies the key benefit of technical expertise from AJs 
that the ALJ-selection process cannot currently guarantee. Ultimately, 
as I discuss, agencies should choose ALJs over AJs in nearly all 
circumstances and seek congressional permission to do so when 
necessary. 
 
 168 See id. ALJs are eligible for the highest pay after seven years of service. See ALJ 
Pay Fact Sheet, supra note 164 (“Required Waiting Periods”). 
 169 See Frye, supra note 3, app. B (“2,228 [AJs] are in grades 9 through 15”). Frye 
uncovered a total of 2,692 AJs. See id. Of that group, 237 were not government 
employees, leaving 2,455 government-employed AJs. See id. He reports that 2,228 AJs 
were in pay grades GS-9 through GS-15, see id., which is approximately 91% of the 
2,455 government-employed AJs. 
 170 See Pay & Leave Salaries & Wages, Salary Table 2015-GS, OPM.GOV, 
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/ 
15Tables/html/GS.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) [hereinafter 2015-GS Table]. 
 171 See LIMON, supra note 13, at 3. Limon’s more limited data does not reveal the 
number of AJs who work in the General Service. See id. app. C at 1-6 (not 
differentiating which AJs within an agency receive different pay grades). 
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A. Benefits of Ceding Some Agency Control 
The most important benefit that agencies receive from using ALJs is 
improved appearances of impartiality. This appearance is important in 
two ways: (1) to preclude a successful due-process challenge to AJs 
based on two of the Supreme Court’s most recent due process and 
separation-of-powers decisions (Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.172 
and Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,173 respectively), and (2) to limit a 
public-relations embarrassment, which would very likely exceed the 
SEC fiasco and potentially influence numerous audiences that agencies 
care about. Agencies’ use of ALJs in formal adjudication under the 
APA also provides other, more limited benefits, including a greater 
likelihood of receiving deference on judicial review and absolute 
official immunity for agency adjudicators. To be sure, these more 
limited benefits may be of marginal significance for some agencies, but 
they should still be included in agencies’ formality calculus. 
1. Improving the Appearance of Impartiality 
The key problem with AJs is that agency control over them creates 
an appearance of partiality. This appearance presents two problems — 
a constitutional one and a practical one. 
a. Avoiding a Substantial Due Process Question 
For good reason, the mere appearance of impartiality is as salient as 
actual bias.174 By prohibiting the appearance of partiality, one 
primarily seeks to protect the integrity of the adjudicating body and 
validate the process.175 Notably, these attributes inure primarily to the 
benefit of the agency itself, as opposed to the litigants, because a valid 
process helps to validate final agency action with litigants, reviewing 
courts, Congress, and the public.176 Moreover, policing for 
 
 172 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 173 Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
 174 See Dmitry Bam, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias, 
2011 BYU L. REV. 943, 967 (discussing how recusal standards in American 
jurisdictions center around appearances of impartiality). 
 175 See id. at 968. 
 176 Cf. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 522 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“If the President 
seeks to regulate through impartial adjudication, then insulation of the adjudicator 
from removal at will can help him achieve that goal. And to free a technical 
decisionmaker from the fear of removal without cause can similarly help create 
legitimacy with respect to that official’s regulatory actions by helping to insulate his 
technical decisions from nontechnical political pressure.”). 
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appearances of partiality serves as a prophylaxis for ferreting out 
unconscious bias or bias that professional norms render difficult to 
admit.177 For this reason, as the Supreme Court has recognized, 
adjudicators’ declarations that they lack actual bias are not 
determinative (or even relevant).178 Because of the difficulty in 
determining an adjudicator’s subjective state of mind, due process 
mostly concerns itself with appearances of partiality.179 
The Supreme Court appeared, in the past, to limit its appearance-of-
partiality inquiries only to instances in which the adjudicator had a 
pecuniary interest in the outcome. For instance, the Court in Tumey v. 
Ohio required a mayor to recuse from deciding certain prohibition-
related fines because, for every guilty verdict, a portion of the fine 
supplemented the mayor’s salary and a portion went into the town’s 
general treasury.180 The Court, in Ward v. Monroeville, expanded 
mandated recusal to scenarios where fines from a mayor’s court went 
only into the town’s general treasury.181 
In the context of AJs, the inquiry seemed even more limited. The 
Court’s key decision is Schweiker v. McClure, in which it upheld the 
use of insurance-carrier AJs from, among other things, a partiality 
challenge.182 After noting the AJs’ functional equivalence to ALJs’ 
quasi-judicial capacity, the Court noted that due process applied.183 
The moving parties had not overcome the presumption of an 
adjudicator’s impartiality because “generalized assumptions of possible 
interest” were insufficient.184 The AJs’ connection to insurers was not 
meaningful because the federal government, not the carriers, paid the 
claims and the AJs’ salaries.185 In footnotes, the Court mentioned that 
the challenging parties had not brought any evidence “to support their 
assertion that, for reasons of psychology, institutional loyalty, or 
carrier coercion, [AJs] would be reluctant to differ with carrier 
determinations.”186 It also noted that the AJs’ former or current 
 
 177 See Bam, supra note 174, at 967. 
 178 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 882, 886-87 (2009) 
(before finding a due process violation based on the appearance of partiality, noting 
that the judge at issue declared that he had no actual bias and stating that the Court 
would not determine whether actual bias existed). 
 179 See Bam, supra note 174, at 967. 
 180 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 520, 535 (1927). 
 181 See Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60-62 (1972). 
 182 See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196-97, 200 (1982). 
 183 Id. at 195. 
 184 See id. at 196. 
 185 See id. 
 186 See id. at 196 n.10. 
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employment relationship with the carrier did not create the same 
partiality concerns as “professional relationship[s] between a judge 
and a former partner or associate.”187 McClure was but one decision 
from the 1950s until 1990 in which the Court batted away due process 
challenges to agency procedures and structures.188 
The Court’s reasoning in its latest impartiality decision — focusing 
on appointment and removal, unlike prior decisions — strongly 
disrupts the longstanding narrative that, after McClure, AJs do not 
offend due process.189 In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., a corporate 
defendant was appealing an unfavorable verdict when its president 
contributed $3 million to have Justice Benjamin elected to the West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.190 Only $1,000 went directly to 
the campaign committee; the remaining amount went to a political 
organization and other independent organizations that supported 
Justice Benjamin.191 After defeating the incumbent by fewer than 
50,000 votes,192 Justice Benjamin refused to recuse from Caperton 
because he denied having actual bias.193 
The Supreme Court held that due process required his recusal.194 No 
quid pro quo or actual bias was necessary.195 Instead, the Court was 
“concerned with a more general concept of interests that tempt 
adjudicators to disregard neutrality.”196 The Court merely looked for 
an “unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”197 Such “fears of bias can 
 
 187 See id. at 197 n.11. 
 188 See Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1349-51, for an excellent discussion of 
how the court has approved of SSA ALJs’ “three hat” role as judge and counsel for 
both parties, agency adjudicators’ combined investigatory and adjudicatory functions, 
the minimal procedural requirements of APA § 555 for informal proceedings, privately 
employed AJs, and limited appeal options. 
 189 See, e.g., Kapnik, supra note 152, at 1544-45 (citing VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, 
at 978-79) (“AJs meet the constitutional requirement for due process . . . .”); Krent, 
supra note 74, at 1091 & n.38 (citing Supreme Court decisions from the 1930s and 
1970s for the proposition that “[i]ndividuals enjoyed no Due Process rights to an 
independent judicial officer insulated from presidential supervision”); Verkuil, 
Reflections, supra note 3, at 1350 (“For due process purposes the Court seems willing 
to narrow the bias or conflict of interest inquiry into one involving only pecuniary 
interests.”). 
 190 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873 (2009). 
 191 See id. 
 192 See id. 
 193 See id. at 873-76. 
 194 Id. at 886. 
 195 See id. 
 196 See id. at 878, 881. 
 197 See id. at 881 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971)). 
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arise when — without the other parties’ consent — a man chooses the 
judge in his own cause.”198 Applying this standard, the Court noted 
that the defendant’s president knew that the appeal from the 
unfavorable verdict was pending, fewer than 50,000 votes decided the 
election, and the president’s disproportionate contributions had a 
substantial impact on the election, even if voters ultimately selected 
Justice Benjamin.199 The Court found, accordingly, “a serious, 
objective risk of actual bias that required Justice Benjamin’s recusal” 
because it appeared that the defendant “[chose] the judge in [its] own 
case.”200 Ultimately, these circumstances presented (as the Court’s 
opinion repeated four times) “a possible temptation to the average . . . 
judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.”201 
To be sure, the Court’s decision concerned extreme circumstances in 
the judicial-election context. But impartiality under the Due Process 
Clause is required for administrative adjudication,202 and Caperton’s 
due-process reasoning is even more compelling and requires no 
extension when applied to AJs. 
First and most importantly, the Court considers whether one of the 
parties had a “significant and disproportionate influence” on the 
appointment process.203 For AJs’, the agency’s role in the appointment 
process is much more prominent than the corporate president’s. 
There, the corporate president only indirectly impacted the election 
with disproportionate contributions; voters directly chose Justice 
Benjamin. But the agency directly chooses its AJs.204 The agency, even 
more so than the defendant in Caperton, is frequently a party to 
proceedings before the AJ whom it hired, such as in government-
contract disputes, immigration proceedings, and numerous other 
appellate and enforcement proceedings. The agency directly and 
literally “chooses the judge in [its] own case,” without, as in the case 
of federal judges, any check from another branch or, as in the case of 
ALJs, any approval from another agency.205 This appointment 
 
 198 Id. at 886. 
 199 See id. at 884-86. 
 200 Id. at 886. 
 201 See id. at 878-79, 885-86. 
 202 See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982). I accept this premise for 
my purposes here, but I plan in future work to consider the role of impartiality 
generally in due process. 
 203 See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884. 
 204 See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text. 
 205 Some concerns may exist for ALJs, too. When agencies other than the SSA hire 
ALJs, they often hire current SSA ALJs to avoid the OPM hiring process. See A GUIDE 
TO FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION, supra note 157, at 203. This ability to hire SSA 
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reinforces the “common perception [that] administrative adjudicators 
are likely to be too committed to the agency’s positions” and “imbued 
with the agency’s culture.”206 For a key example, one needs only turn 
to the George W. Bush Administration’s hiring of immigration judges, 
when “[a]ll the judges appointed during this period who arrived with 
experience in immigration law were prosecutors or held other 
immigration enforcement jobs.”207 
Second, in what appears contrary to McClure, the Court relied only 
on the circumstances of Justice Benjamin’s election to find an 
appearance of partiality.208 This suggests that evidence concerning 
adjudicators’ appointment and removal can adequately demonstrate 
the “psychological tendencies and human weaknesses” that create 
bias. Importantly, the appointment and removal of privately employed 
AJs in McClure is distinguishable from government-employed AJs, 
with the latter creating easily understood bias concerns. Government-
employed AJs receive their salaries from the agencies that may appear 
before them and that seek to pursue certain policy and enforcement 
objectives, unlike the insurer in McClure that did not pay the AJs, have 
any of its money at issue, or have any policy goals to further through 
the adjudications. 
Third, the Court discounted a judge’s denials of bias. In one survey 
from the early 1990s, AJs reported having less anxiety over their 
impartiality than more independent ALJs,209 leading one prominent 
scholar to conclude that the relationship between structural 
protections and impartiality for AJs is overstated.210 Yet that report is 
of little weight because due process concerns itself with not only 
conscious but also, much more frequently, unconscious bias and 
circumstances that could create it. 
In addition to these express considerations concerning appointment, 
the Court also likely implicitly contemplated the appointing party’s 
related power to help later remove the judge. After all, the President 
appoints federal judges, and he or she may soon thereafter appear 
 
ALJs permits the hiring agency more control over hiring ALJs than the OPM process, 
but these ALJs had to comply originally with the OPM-approved process to be hired 
by the SSA. 
 206 Koch, Policymaking, supra note 3, at 702-03. 
 207 See Goldstein & Eggen, supra note 23. 
 208 The Court did mention a public-opinion poll and certain other West Virginia 
Justices’ views that recusal was required in the background in its opinion, but it did 
not mention these “facts” in its analysis. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 874-75, 886-87. 
 209 See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 271, 279 (1994). 
 210 See id. 
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frequently as a party before them. But the mere appointment does not 
create an appearance of partiality because the President — having no 
role in the impeachment process211 — has no meaningful way to 
discipline or remove the judge for ruling against him or her. The 
difference in Caperton is that the donor had the wherewithal to fund 
Justice Benjamin’s opponent in the next election if Justice Benjamin 
did not reward his benefactor. For AJs, the appointing agency has a 
much more direct way in which to remove the AJ. That agency can 
directly remove the AJ without, as with ALJs or federal judges, another 
agency’s or branch’s signoff. The President or a supervising officer 
could, despite potential political backlash, have the AJ find facts or 
apply law in certain ways or discipline or remove those who are not 
“cooperative.” AJs, similar to the mayor in Tumey, can have their pay 
affected depending on what decision they make; they are literally on 
one of the parties’ payroll. Performance reviews and ex parte 
communications, the vehicles for effecting discipline and pushing 
agency positions, are not public, thereby concealing agency influence. 
With this direct agency control over appointment and removal, it is 
difficult to see how Caperton’s “unconstitutional potential for bias” 
would not exist with AJs. 
A second recent decision — specifically focusing on the link 
between removal and control212 — buttresses this conclusion. In Free 
Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, the Court precluded Congress from 
cocooning the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(“PCAOB”) within two layers of protection from the President’s at-will 
removal.213 The SEC Commissioners, whom the President could not 
remove at will (the first layer), could appoint PCAOB members and 
remove them only for cause (the second layer).214 Together, these 
layers unconstitutionally impinged the President’s supervisory power 
by preventing him from holding the SEC responsible for PCAOB’s 
actions in the same manner as he could hold the SEC accountable for 
its other responsibilities.215 Importantly for our purposes here, the 
Court reaffirmed that the power to remove officials is key for 
 
 211 See Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, supra note 3, at 831 & n.220 (arguing 
that proposals to provide ALJs the same protections as Article III judges would likely 
violate the President’s supervisory powers over executive officials because the 
President has no role in impeachment). 
 212 See Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2013) 
(questioning Free Enterprise Fund’s conclusion that removal gives control). 
 213 See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 483-84 (2010). 
 214 See id. at 486-87. 
 215 See id. at 495-96. 
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establishing control because “one who holds his office only during the 
pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude 
of independence against the latter’s will.”216 AJs, of course, work at the 
pleasure of the agency, which also generally assesses performance 
reviews that can affect their pay.217 Free Enterprise Fund establishes the 
following: (1) the agency’s power to remove (or transfer) and affect 
AJs’ pay gives agencies control, and (2) that control impacts 
impartiality. Indeed, the majority went out of its way to indicate that 
ALJs, with their two layers of protection, were a special case because 
of their adjudicative function218 and, presumptively, need to be free 
from policymakers’ interference. 
These relationships among removal, control, and impartiality were 
not lost on the APA drafters and early implementers. The perceived 
bias of adjudicators was the impetus for establishing the APA’s formal 
adjudication with protections concerning ALJs’ appointment, 
performance review, and removal.219 Hearings were intended to be 
heard by independent ALJs to ensure that “whoever presides . . . must 
conduct the hearing in a strictly impartial manner, rather than as the 
representative of an investigative or prosecuting authority.”220 Indeed, 
speaking against performance reviews for adjudicators shortly after the 
APA’s enactment and striking down agencies’ ability to promote ALJs 
to higher pay grades, U.S. Attorney General J. Howard McGrath stated 
that “[i]f salaries and promotions are subject to agency control, there 
is always danger that a subtle influence will be exerted upon the 
examiners to decide in accordance with agency wishes.”221 Notably, 
the Attorney General made these comments when all oral hearings 
required by statute were presumed to be subject to the APA’s formality 
requirements.222 The fact that courts have altered the presumption and 
allowed AJs to “sprout[] faster than tulips in Holland”223 does not 
 
 216 See id. at 493 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)). 
 217 See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text. 
 218 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 507 n.10. 
 219 See Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1353 & n.51 (citing Justice Scalia for 
the proposition that hearing examiners before the APA were perceived as biased); see 
also Scalia, supra note 43, at 65-66 (describing the history of the ALJ-promotion 
system). 
 220 S. REP. NO. 752 at 207 (1946), reprinted in COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 268 (1946). 
 221 See Wolfe, supra note 138, at 223 (quoting Administrative Procedure Act, 
Promotion of Hearing Examiners, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 74, 78 (1951)). 
 222 See Funk, Wong Yang Sung, supra note 35, at 884 (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. 
Clark, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950)). 
 223 See Lubbers, APA-Adjudication, supra note 147, at 70. 
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undermine the link between control and agency influence. Moreover, 
the link has not been lost on legal commenters,224 including a former 
AJ and ALJ.225 Together, Caperton and Free Enterprise Fund establish a 
compelling basis for holding that agencies’ use of AJs violates due 
process.226 
Let me conclude by addressing five possible objections: 
First. Aside from IJ hiring and firing, might the absence of any 
public outcry over AJs provide some ground for concluding that no 
objective appearance of partiality exists?227 The emphatic answer, 
especially for AJs, is no. One of AJs’ key attributes is that they are a 
“hidden judiciary,” toiling away largely unnoticed. If they are noticed, 
they are likely to be confused with ALJs because of their similar titles. 
It would be perverse to create a principle under which the government 
could preclude appearances of partiality by creating an opaque 
adjudicatory system and similar titles for judges with and without 
independence. Administrative adjudication does not become fairer by 
becoming harder to understand. 
 
 224 See Dobkin, supra note 23, at 381 (“Because agencies sometimes base hiring — 
and firing — practices on the outcomes they expect to receive from administrative 
judges, these judges are under enormous pressure to keep their employers happy.”); 
McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind, supra note 52, at 210 (“Most observers agree that a 
lack of independence from the agencies they serve is the main reason for the 
seemingly uniform bias of administrative judges in favor of those agencies.”); Wolfe, 
supra note 138, at 245 (“Adjudication by non-APA hearing officers, who are subject to 
the control, direction, performance rating, promotion, and discipline of their 
employing agency poses the risk of the potential curtailment of a [claimant’s] due 
process rights.”). 
 225 See Frye, supra note 3, at 261, 268 (“It is self-evident that, to the extent that the 
agencies use informal means to control the process and its substantive results, they 
detract from the impartiality of the presiding officer, the fairness of the proceeding, 
and the satisfaction of the public with the results.”). 
 226 The agency’s ability to overrule AJs on fact and law does not mean that their 
decisions are meaningless. Their credibility findings (like ALJs’) can be very 
significant, affecting whether the record supports an agency’s contrary decision on 
administrative appeal. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951) 
(considering findings by an ALJ); see also VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1036 (noting 
that ALJ findings are particularly influential on courts when based on inferences from 
testimonial demeanor). Indeed, appellate courts review with a more careful eye agency 
findings that are contrary to initial findings. See Penasquitos Vill., Inc. v. NLRB, 565 
F.2d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 1977) (referring to NLRB v. Tom Johnson, Inc., 378 F.2d 
342, 344 (9th Cir. 1967), and NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 499 
(2d Cir. 1967)). 
 227 See Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1347 (“Despite these differences, it 
appears that litigants and the public do not object to the process by which 
administrative judges are selected.”). 
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Second. Isn’t it sufficient that many AJs are required by statute, 
regulation, or manual to be impartial228 or that the agency has certain 
de facto understandings that discourage interfering with AJ decisional 
independence?229 No. These requirements or understandings may 
mean well, but they do not answer the impartiality question. After all, 
federal and state judges are required to be impartial under the Code of 
Judicial Conduct,230 but — even if they believe subjectively that they 
are impartial — they can, as Caperton itself demonstrates, still create 
an appearance of partiality. More fundamentally, the statutory 
requirement for impartiality is not a structural prophylaxis against bias 
like regulating the appointment, performance-review, and removal 
processes. The litigants are also not in a position to know the AJs’ 
performance reviews, express or implicit threats of removal or 
reassignment, or the agency culture that may reduce impartiality. De 
facto norms also do not address the ease of their breach or how AJs 
may feel pressure to minimize the breadth of these understandings 
when those who may have a say in their retention and pay have 
contrary “understandings.” 
Third. Doesn’t AJs’ due process problem prove too much because it 
implicates all administrative adjudication? After all, will agency heads 
— nominated by the President and often removable at will — not be 
similarly pressured to abide by the President’s wishes when reviewing 
and (very rarely) presiding over hearings? This argument has some 
force, but the due process problem can be justifiably confined to AJs 
based on differences in agency heads’ function, their method of 
appointment, salience of removal, and necessity. First, agency heads 
are much more likely to be deciding policy matters finally for the 
agency, and that policy discretion will be limited by the hearing 
record. Although AJs and ALJs can make policy in the first instance, 
their policy decisions are subject to reversal by the agency heads and 
deputies. The President probably is entitled to oversee the policies via 
 
 228 For example, the Supreme Court pointed to such a requirement in the manual 
that the government drafted to advise insurance-carrier AJs. See Schweiker v. 
McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 197 n.11 (1982).  
 229 See, e.g., Frye, supra note 3, at 344 (discussing de facto understandings of 
separation of functions for AJs with no other duties and ex parte prohibitions). 
 230 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2011) (“A judge shall . . . perform 
[the] duties of judicial office . . . impartially.”). Whether the Code of Judicial Conduct 
or similar ethical code should apply to state and federal ALJs is a perennially contested 
issue. See generally Steven A. Glazer, Toward a Model Code of Judicial Conduct for 
Federal Administrative Law Judges, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 337 (2012); Patricia E. Salkin, 
Judging Ethics for Administrative Law Judges: Adoption of a Uniform Code of Judicial 
Conduct for the Administrative Judiciary, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 7 (2002). 
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at-will removal authority for matters that are related to core executive 
power, such as foreign affairs and defense.231 Second, the President’s 
nomination of agency heads may be less troubling than AJs because 
the Senate must confirm the nomination,232 and the agency head may 
balance the views of the President with those of the confirming Senate 
that may differ.233 Similarly, agency heads’ at-will removal234 may be 
less troubling than AJs because their removal has a much stronger 
salience than low-level agency employees like AJs.235 Agency heads 
likely have their own political capital and relationships on Capitol Hill 
and in the press, which permit them to create political backlash for the 
President for questionable removals. The third distinction may be the 
most important: agency heads’ appointment and removal (and any 
accompanying downsides) are required236 by the Appointment and the 
Take Care Clauses. If executive agencies’ ability to adjudicate is 
beyond peradventure despite these constraints, then agencies heads’ 
appointment and removal cannot alone create a constitutional defect. 
The same kind of necessity or compulsion does not apply to AJs, who 
can be appointed in other ways (such as ALJs are or, as I have 
suggested elsewhere, should be237) and removed only for cause (as 
ALJs are). 
Fourth. Should agencies really be worried that the Court will apply 
Caperton — an opinion that refers to its narrow holding in the 
judicial-election context — to agencies? Although the Court could, of 
 
 231 See Kent H. Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1349, 1404 n.215 (2013). 
 232 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring presidential nomination and 
senatorial confirmation for “principal officers”). 
 233 See David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology, 20 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 438, 439 (2004) (“[P]residents must anticipate the preferences of the Senate 
in order to get their nominees confirmed, and a potential nominee’s policy preferences 
are central to explaining the appointment outcome.”). 
 234 See Robert V. Percival, Who’s In Charge? Does the President Have Directive 
Authority Over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2490 (2011) 
(noting that President has “ability to remove non-independent agency heads at will”). 
 235 See Kent H. Barnett, Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers, 91 IND. L.J., at *31 
(forthcoming 2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2573216 (discussing the salience of removing senior executive officials); Percival, supra 
note 234, passim (discussing the substantial costs of removal to effect policy ends). 
 236 Congress’s power to limit the President’s ability to remove executive officers at 
will — especially in core departments, such as State and Defense — is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 237 See Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, supra note 3, at 832-35 (advocating 
that the D.C. Circuit appoint and remove ALJs to avoid appointment, removal, and 
due process concerns). 
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course, leave Caperton as an outlier of its due process jurisprudence, 
two considerations counsel agency caution. First, my analysis here 
requires no extension of Caperton’s reasoning; it requires only an 
extension of the contextual setting. The reasoning in Caperton is even 
more compelling in the agency context because the agency’s role in 
hiring and firing is more direct than in the judicial-donor context. AJs 
are even better candidates than state supreme courts for federal 
judicial scrutiny because of AJs’ lack of comparative transparency, 
salience, federalism complications, and factual variations surrounding 
their systemic protections. Relatedly, heightened concern over AJs’ 
partiality makes sense because of courts’ limited oversight of AJ 
decision-making. Not only do courts have little interest in what they 
perceive as AJs’ low-prestige docket,238 but their review of AJ factual 
findings — generally under the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious-review 
standard — is often deemed the most deferential in all of 
administrative law.239 Second, the ramifications for the agency if it 
loses are huge. Based on Caperton, the courts would likely require a 
new proceeding for the litigant. But unlike Caperton where one justice 
could simply recuse himself in the new proceeding, a due process 
violation to AJs is systemic and would require regulatory or statutory 
changes to AJ hiring, removal, and oversight. These changes would be 
difficult to implement quickly, and they may require slow-moving 
congressional action. Instead of reacting to a decision that requires 
agencies to abandon AJs, agencies have the ability to recognize the due 
process problem now, choose ALJs where possible, and seek 
congressional permission when necessary.240 
 
 238 See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional 
Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 68 (2015) (noting that federal courts’ creation of an 
appellate review model over agency action are an example of federal courts seeking to 
“mitigate[] [the] caseload demands created by the new federal regulatory state” and to 
remove “[p]etty” cases from their docket). 
 239 See AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 970 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
arbitrary-and-capricious review is “more deferential” to agencies than the substantial 
evidence standard); see also Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of 
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.) 
(finding no difference between “arbitrary, capricious” and “substantial evidence” 
standards for judicial review of agency findings of fact). 
 240 Agencies concerned about congressional lethargy may be able to create 
sufficiently independent AJs through their own initiatives (if the underlying statutes 
otherwise permit). They could, by rule, enact the same procedural protections for 
parties as under the APA, limit the hiring of AJs to those who prevail in a merits-based 
application process, limit the removal of AJs for only “good cause” as determined by 
the MSPB, and prohibit performance reviews and bonuses. 
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Fifth. Might the Court avoid applying Caperton to agencies because 
of its general dislike for systemic, facial challenges? The Court, in the 
racial-discrimination context, has indicated its distaste for inferring 
bias in a particular case based on systemic bias,241 and it has indicated 
its distaste for facial statutory challenges.242 In the administrative 
context, the Court’s refusal to find a due process problem in Withrow 
v. Larkin — based on a state agency’s ability to hold investigative and 
merits hearings — may indicate the Court would be unwilling to find 
a systemic due process problem when it implicates common features 
of administrative process.243 Caperton, in fact, could be understood as 
consistent with this understanding because it addressed one very 
specific and extreme case concerning one judge without a broad, 
disruptive holding.244 These are significant rebuttals, but they should 
not preclude Caperton’s application here. 
Courts routinely consider systemic protections or the lack thereof in 
partiality challenges, and their holdings concerning one judge or 
system would necessarily impact other tribunals. For instance, the 
Court’s partiality decisions concerning mayors’ courts specifically 
addressed only two small-town mayors. But the holding that saw 
danger in remuneration to the mayor or his town would likewise affect 
all mayors’ courts across the country, and it would be far from clear 
that any other judge could preside, at least without legislative 
intervention, to remedy the partiality problem. Likewise, albeit 
rejecting the challenge, the Court considered the structural 
impartiality challenge to the private hearing officers in McClure, and, 
notably, that challenge did not focus on any particular adjudicator. 
Moreover, a facial challenge in this context makes sense, at least for 
similarly situated AJs. For AJs that share all key traits (no for-cause 
protection from removal, appointment by their agencies, eligible for 
performance-review bonuses, etc.), the matter requires little to no 
discovery and the partiality problem would exist in all cases (not just 
the litigated one). As a final matter, Withrow concerned heads of an 
 
 241 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (refusing to infer bias in a 
capital defendant’s case based on studies indicating that black defendants in Georgia 
received the death penalty more than white defendants). My thanks to Aziz Huq for 
this insight. 
 242 See Caitlin Borgmann, Holding Legislatures Constitutionally Accountable Through 
Facial Challenges, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 563, 574-88 (2009). 
 243 See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 57-58 (1975). 
 244 Indeed, the majority and the dissent in Caperton argued over the breadth of the 
Court’s decision and its potentially disruptive impacts. Compare Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 887-90 (2009), with id. at 893-902 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
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agency, not adjudicators, and the propriety of combined functions of 
investigation and adjudication in one agency, not the appearance of 
partiality of administrative adjudicators. Although Withrow may show 
some hesitation for the courts to limit agency powers, it does not 
foreclose Caperton and Free Enterprise Fund’s application to AJs. 
b. Avoiding Practical Distractions 
Even in the absence of the Due Process Clause, the SEC’s very 
recent experiences with ALJs highlight why agencies have a significant 
practical interest in providing adjudications with the appearance of 
impartiality. First, agencies have to worry about winning lawsuits. The 
SEC, instead of spending its time investigating and enforcing securities 
laws, is currently distracted by trying to win lawsuits that seek to 
upend the SEC’s (and sometimes the entire federal administrative 
state’s) administrative-adjudicative apparatus. Those lawsuits allege, 
among other things, constitutional infirmity with all SEC ALJs’ 
appointments and/or all ALJs’ removal (at any agency) under Article 
II.245 Two federal district courts have preliminary enjoined the SEC’s 
use of ALJs based on how they are appointed.246 
But what do these appointment and removal challenges have to do 
with impartiality? Nothing, as far as establishing the elements of those 
causes of action. Nor do any of the parties assert a due process 
challenge concerning impartiality. And that is what is fascinating. The 
complaints use partiality, instead, to “color” — for courts, the press, 
 
 245 Complaint at 21-23, Timbervest v. SEC, (No. 1:15-cv-02106-LMM), 2015 WL 
7597428 (N.D. Ga. June 12, 2015) [hereinafter Timbervest Complaint] (asserting 
appointment and removal claims); Amended Complaint at 32-36, Hill v. SEC, (No. 
1:15-cv-01801-LMM), 2015 WL 4307088 (N.D. Ga. May 29, 2015) [hereinafter Hill 
Amended Complaint] (asserting removal claims); Complaint at 16-21, Tilton v. SEC, 
No. 1:15-cv-02472-RA (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Tilton Complaint] 
(asserting appointment and removal claims); Complaint at 13-15, Stilwell v. SEC, No. 
1:14-cv-07931 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Stilwell Complaint] (asserting 
removal claim); Second Amended Complaint at 23-29, Gray Fin. Group, Inc. v. SEC, 
No. 1:15-cv-00492-CAP (N.D. Ga. Feb. 19, 2015); Amended Complaint at 11-14, 
Duka v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-00357 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2015) (asserting removal claim). 
 246 See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1316, 1320 (2015); Decision and 
Order at 3-6, Duka v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-00357 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2015) (holding that 
the ALJs were “inferior officers” and appointed improperly under the Appointments 
Clause, and giving the SEC seven days to decide whether to cure the defect). Another 
of the cases was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Opinion and 
Order at 1-2, Tilton v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-02472-RA (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015). Another 
was voluntarily dismissed by agreement of the parties. See Notice of Voluntary 
Dismissal, Stilwell v. SEC, No. 1:14-cv-07931 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2015). 
  
1684 University of California, Davis [Vol. 49:1643 
and perhaps Congress — what might be understood as technical, 
formal constitutional failings. 
For instance, in Tilton v. SEC, the plaintiffs referred to one of the 
SEC Commissioner’s concerns over how the SEC appears to bring 
“tougher cases” in administrative adjudication where the parties have 
limited discovery rights, instead of Article III courts.247 More 
pointedly, the complaint (along with several others248) referred to a 
2013 New York Times article that highlighted the SEC’s higher success 
rate in administrative, as opposed to judicial, proceedings.249 Likewise, 
the complaint in Hill v. SEC referred to the Wall Street Journal’s 
empirical report that the SEC won in 95% of its proceedings between 
January 2010 and March 2015, a prominent federal judge’s (U.S. 
District Judge Jed Rakoff’s) remark that the SEC had won 100% of its 
administrative actions in 2014 as compared to 61% in court, and a 
former SEC ALJ’s public statements that the proceedings were not 
impartial and that the Chief ALJ for the SEC had questioned her 
“loyalty to the SEC” because of her decisions against the agency.250 As 
a final example, the latest complaint (in Timbervest v. SEC), aside from 
mentioning everything above, more directly addressed the partiality 
concern. It noted how the presiding ALJ at issue “ha[d] yet to rule 
against the agency” since his hiring in 2011,251 how the plaintiff 
sought discovery on partiality issues in administrative proceedings,252 
and how the presiding ALJ declined to submit an affidavit (in response 
to the SEC’s request) affirming that he did not feel pressured to rule 
for the agency.253 
 
 247 Hill Amended Complaint, supra note 245, at 21 (referring to Commissioner’s 
statement concerning the perception surrounding how “tougher cases” are 
adjudicated); Tilton Complaint, supra note 245, at 8-10 (citing Michael S. Piwowar, 
Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at the “SEC Speaks” Conference 2015: A Fair, Orderly and 
Efficient SEC (Feb. 20, 2015)). A recent empirical study has concluded that “the SEC 
[is] shifting more marginal cases from court to administrative proceedings or bringing 
actions as administrative proceedings that would not have been brought at all pre-
Dodd Frank.” Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative 
Proceedings: An Empirical Assessment 37 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 16-10, 2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737105. 
 248 Stilwell Complaint, supra note 245, at 7. 
 249 Id. (citing Gretchen Morgenson). 
 250 Hill Amended Complaint, supra note 245, at 19-20. Other ALJs have made 
similar complaints about other agencies, too. See McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind, supra 
note 52, at 213 (collecting cases). 
 251 Timbervest Complaint, supra note 245, at 6. 
 252 Id. at 8. 
 253 Id. at 9-10. 
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The parties’ ability to control the partiality narrative appears 
successful. They have caught the notice of Judge Rakoff, national 
media, regulated parties, powerful interest groups,254 and may have 
even colored one district court’s Appointments Clause holding, which 
it recognized as seeming “unduly technical.”255 And congressional 
oversight, in light of corporate interest groups, may not be far off. 
After all, Congress and the public were keenly interested in the 
partisan hiring of IJs.256 In short, the failure to create the appearance of 
impartiality has led to significant distraction and cost for the SEC in 
attempting to fulfill its securities-enforcement mission. The SEC’s 
curious public request that its own ALJ submit an affidavit concerning 
his partiality further demonstrates that the SEC understands the 
seriousness of the partiality narrative. After its clumsy affidavit request 
and several losses in the federal litigation concerning the ALJs’ 
appointments, the SEC responded by indicating that it would 
“modernize [its] rules of practice for administrative proceedings” by, 
most importantly, extending discovery rights.257 
For agencies with AJs, the partiality narrative — once it comes to 
light — is likely to be much worse for reasons that should feel familiar 
by now. Aside from invoking agency win rates in particular in-house 
proceedings,258 parties can point to AJs’ proceedings, which are 
typically less formal than ALJs’. They can point to the differences 
between AJs’ appointment process, where the agency generally has 
carte blanche in hiring those whom it thinks may be most 
“cooperative” with the agency mission, and the OPM-limiting ALJ-
hiring process. This hiring authority in and of itself may not be too 
troubling because, after all, federal judges are selected, in part, based 
 
 254 See Eaglesham, In-House Court, supra note 149. 
 255 See Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2015). 
 256 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 111, at 1 (noting that Goodling testified before 
the House of Representatives); Eric Lichtblau, Report Faults Aides in Hiring at Justice 
Dept., N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/washington/ 
29justice.html. 
 257 Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes to Amend Rules Governing Administrative 
Proceedings (Sept. 24, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-
209.html. 
 258 See, e.g., McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind, supra note 52, at 205-11 (reviewing 
statistics concerning agency win rates in federal-employee whistleblower actions 
before MSPB AJs, determining that agencies win in 95% of the cases, and concluding 
that they are “astoundingly biased in favor of [agencies]”); see also McCarthy, MSPB 
Judges, supra note 163, at 37, 40 (contrasting agency win rates in whistleblower 
actions before AJs and ALJs, the latter of whom decide for employees in approximately 
33% of cases).  
  
1686 University of California, Davis [Vol. 49:1643 
on how they are likely to rule.259 But then, they can point to how a 
supermajority of AJs receives performance reviews (and potentially 
bonuses) from the agencies that often appear before them, while 
agencies are prohibited from reviewing (and giving bonuses) to ALJs. 
They can point to how agencies can remove AJs at will or assign them 
different duties, but those same agencies cannot do the same with 
ALJs. In the end, the benefits that agencies garner from controlling AJs 
exacerbate the appearance of AJs being in the agency’s pocket, and this 
appearance creates costs for the agency by distracting it from 
executing its mission. And the larger number of AJs would likely only 
exacerbate those costs as compared to those of the SEC’s ALJ 
proceedings. 
This threat is not merely hypothetical. Federal courts of appeals lost 
faith in IJs around the time of the Bush-era hiring and firing scandals. 
Indeed, as one commenter put it, these courts “lambasted the work of 
immigration judges.”260 The Seventh Circuit, in particular, led by the 
eminent Judge Richard Posner reversed “a staggering 40 percent” of 
orders from the Board of Immigration Appeals in 2005.261 The Second, 
Third, and Ninth Circuits also noted their concern over IJ agency 
adjudication.262 And most of the courts’ concerns related to the IJs’ 
bias and lack of professionalism.263 Agencies, in short, ignore ALJs at 
their peril in seeking to accomplish their regulatory missions. 
2. Increasing Likelihood of Judicial Deference 
Aside from improving appearances of impartiality, using ALJs and 
formal adjudication increases the likelihood of courts giving agencies 
interpretive primacy over ambiguous statutes and thus faring better on 
judicial review. To obtain interpretive primacy, agencies must receive 
Chevron, as opposed to Skidmore, deference. Chevron deference is 
 
 259 See Jackson, supra note 26, at 977-79 (2007) (arguing that the appointment of 
Article III judges is, by design, political and discussing role of ideology in 
appointments). 
 260 Katherine E. Melloy, Note, Telling Truths: How the Real ID Act’s Credibility 
Provisions Affect Women Asylum Seekers, 92 IOWA L. REV. 637, 663-64 (2007) 
(discussing those courts’ impatience with IJs). 
 261 Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.); see also 
id. (“Our criticisms of the Board and of the immigration judges have frequently been 
severe.”). 
 262 See id. (collecting cases). 
 263 See id. (citing Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 
2005)) (“[T]he [IJ’s] assessment of Petitioner’s credibility was skewed by 
prejudgment, personal speculation, bias, and conjecture . . . .”). 
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generally understood to be more deferential to agencies because it 
recognizes their authority to interpret reasonably ambiguous statutes 
that they administer.264 With Skidmore deference, in contrast, courts 
retain interpretive primacy, deferring to agencies’ views only when the 
“thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and 
all those factors which give it power to persuade” convince it to do 
so.265 The Supreme Court, in United States v. Mead Corp., has 
identified two key matters, as relevant here, to determine generally 
whether agencies have acted with the “force of law” and are thus 
eligible for Chevron deference: whether Congress has bestowed 
rulemaking or formal adjudication authority upon the agency, and 
whether the agency has used that authority in promulgating the 
interpretation at issue.266 Although some have criticized the Court’s 
focus on procedural formality as a criterion for deference, procedural 
formality is consistent with the view that administrative procedures 
further congressional monitoring of agencies. Formal procedures 
usually provide more visibility, transparency, and opportunities for 
Congress to assert subtle pressure on agencies as to policy questions 
than informal actions.267 In evaluating formality’s role in Chevron 
eligibility, commenters and courts have generally focused on whether 
agencies’ interpretations have the “force of law” when promulgated 
 
 264 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-
44 (1984) (“The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally 
created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of 
rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.” (quoting Morton v. 
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974))); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial 
Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 79 (2011) [hereinafter Studies 
of Judicial Review] (“Since 2001, the Justices have engaged in a lively debate about the 
circumstances in which [Chevron or Skidmore] applies. That debate indicates that all 
Justices believe that the doctrines differ and that the Chevron doctrine is more 
deferential . . . .”). 
 265 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 266 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-32 (2001) (“It is fair to assume 
generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law [to 
which Chevron applies] when it provides for a relatively formal administrative 
procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a 
pronouncement of such force. Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases applying 
Chevron deference [has] reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or 
formal adjudication.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 267 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional 
Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2043-44 (2011). 
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through less formal “guidance” documents, such as agency manuals, 
enforcement guidelines, or interpretive rules.268 
But another, often-ignored issue lurks in the Chevron eligibility 
analysis: whether agencies choose formal or informal adjudicatory 
hearings. When agencies act through formal adjudication under the APA 
and thus almost always use an ALJ, Mead provides that they are generally 
eligible for Chevron deference. But the same is not true of informal 
adjudication. In Mead itself, the Court refused, after determining that 
Chevron did not apply, to defer to statutory interpretations arising from 
informal adjudication.269 Instead, courts must engage in an indeterminate 
inquiry as to whether the informal interpretation at issue is Chevron-
eligible.270 Thus, agencies can obtain heightened judicial review more 
easily for issues of law by choosing ALJs. 
With all of this said, one should not overstate the importance of 
formal adjudication as a talisman for Chevron deference. It is, instead, 
a useful tool for improving agencies’ chances of receiving Chevron 
deference. First, formal adjudication is not necessary for Chevron 
deference. Chevron can apply to certain relatively formalized hearings 
presided over by AJs, even if they do not constitute “formal 
adjudication.” For instance, courts apply Chevron deference to 
decisions from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), whose 
members are AJs.271 Relatedly, formal adjudication may not be 
sufficient for Chevron deference because not all courts extend Chevron 
deference to ALJ decisions that did not undergo administrative 
 
 268 See, e.g., Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 56-57 (2015) 
[hereinafter Codifying Chevmore] (discussing courts’ confusion over which agency 
actions have the force of law); Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial 
Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1444-45 (2005) [hereinafter Muddled 
Judicial Review] (focusing on how courts of appeals have implemented Mead when 
agencies do not proceed through notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal 
adjudication); Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 
468-70 (2013) (concentrating generally on whether IRS guidance documents have 
force of law). 
 269 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 231-33. 
 270 See generally Bressman, Muddled Judicial Review, supra note 268, passim 
(discussing the confusion that Mead has caused lower courts in determining when 
informal action receives Chevron deference). 
 271 See Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 530 (2003). An IJ’s determination without BIA review may 
receive only Skidmore deference. See, e.g., Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 
915, 920-24 (9th Cir. 2006); Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 189-90 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (refusing to apply Chevron deference to an IJ decision that the BIA 
summarily affirmed). 
  
2016] Against Administrative Judges 1689 
review.272 Formal adjudication, accordingly, is not necessary or 
sufficient for Chevron review, but it increases the likelihood of an 
agency winning the “deference lottery.”273 
Second, because empirical studies have found that agency win rates 
under Chevron and Skidmore overlap, Chevron deference may not be as 
important for agencies as other concerns in its cost-benefit calculus. 
Dick Pierce, after summarizing several studies, noted that courts 
affirmed agency action from 60% to 81.3% of the time under Chevron, 
while they affirmed from 55.1% to 73.5% of the time under 
Skidmore.274 But, as I have argued elsewhere, there are significant 
reasons to evaluate the studies that create that overlap.275 For instance, 
one should discount studies that found a lower win rate (64% or 
65.2%) for agencies than other studies under Chevron (and thus made 
Chevron look less useful to agencies) because they expressly 
considered, respectively, only two “politically contentious” agencies276 
or one court.277 And one should place a premium on a study that 
found a lower agency win rate (60.4%) under Skidmore (and thus 
suggested that Chevron is more beneficial to agencies) because, as it 
was the only study to consider Skidmore cases after Mead reinvigorated 
the dormant Skidmore doctrine in 2001, it is more probative of current 
judicial practice.278 With these qualifications in mind, the differences 
between Chevron and Skidmore deference become more meaningful 
and demonstrate that choosing formality provides a greater likelihood 
of receiving deference on judicial review. 
 
 272 See Brendan C. Selby, Internal Agency Review, Authoritativeness, and Mead, 37 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 539, 575 n.248 (2013) (“The law on the extent to which such 
lower-level actors may receive Chevron deference for decisions conducted through 
formal adjudication is unsettled.”).  
 273 See Christopher J. Walker, Response, How to Win the Deference Lottery, 91 TEX. 
L. REV. SEE ALSO 73, 79 (2013) (discussing when agencies should invest in formalities 
to obtain deference). 
 274 Pierce, Studies of Judicial Review, supra note 264, at 85. 
 275 See Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, supra note 268, at 67. 
 276 See id. (citing Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory 
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 848 (2006) 
(focusing study on “two important agencies known for producing politically 
contentious decisions: the EPA and the NLRB”)). 
 277 See Pierce, Studies of Judicial Review, supra note 264, at 84 (citing Frank B. 
Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: 
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2168, 2182 tbl.3 
(1998) (considering D.C. Circuit decisions)). 
 278 See id. (citing Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the 
Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1275 (2007)). 
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3. Increasing Likelihood of Absolute Official Immunity 
Choosing ALJs can also bestow on agencies another limited benefit: 
increasing the likelihood of obtaining official immunity for 
administrative adjudicators. Losing litigants in administrative 
proceedings may assert constitutional or statutory claims against 
administrative adjudicators based on, among other things, due process 
(bias), the First Amendment, or the Fourth Amendment.279 To keep 
agency adjudicators focused on deciding cases and able to avoid 
discovery, agencies should prefer that their adjudicators have absolute 
immunity, as opposed to qualified immunity. The former protects 
adjudicators from even bad faith, intentional, or malicious legal 
violations, while the latter only extends to good faith misconduct that 
does not violate a clearly established right.280 Aside from scienter 
concerns, the key difference between these two immunities is that 
absolute immunity allows an immune defendant to escape the lawsuit 
before discovery, while qualified immunity permits disputes over 
issues of fact.281 For agencies, absolute immunity shields their 
adjudicators from having to worry about collateral litigation at all, 
even if those adjudicators are extremely likely to prevail on the merits. 
ALJs have absolute immunity. In a lawsuit against an ALJ in the 
Department of Agriculture, the Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou 
held that ALJs are entitled to absolute immunity from suit.282 They 
were so entitled because of ALJs’ quasi-judicial function, the 
procedures required for formal adjudication, and, “more importantly,” 
the APA’s structure that assures ALJs’ “independent judgment on the 
evidence before [them], free from pressures by the parties or other 
officials within the agency.”283 Those structures are the ones that are 
familiar by now: separation of functions, absence of agency 
supervision, prohibitions on ex parte contacts, limits on removing 
ALJs, and another agency’s control over ALJs’ pay.284 
 
 279 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 483 (1978) (discussing causes of 
action brought against agency officials, including an ALJ). 
 280 Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. 
REV. 53, 54. 
 281 See Andrew Horowitz, Taking the Cop out of Copping a Plea: Eradicating Police 
Prosecution of Criminal Cases, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1305, 1314 (1998) (discussing the key 
difference between absolute and qualified immunity, as noted by the Supreme Court 
in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-26 (1976)).  
 282 Butz, 438 U.S. at 512-13. 
 283 Id. at 513. 
 284 See id. at 513-14. 
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But whether AJs receive absolute immunity is far from certain. 
Notably, of course, AJs do not share with ALJs the attributes that the 
Court found “most important.” The Supreme Court in Cleavinger v. 
Saxner refused to grant absolute immunity to prison officials who 
adjudicated inmate infractions because the hearings provided fewer 
procedural safeguards than in Butz and because of the officers’ lack of 
independence.285 The Court distinguished these officials from those 
who are “professional hearing officers, as are [ALJs].”286 Although the 
term “professional hearing officers” could include federal AJs, the 
Court’s distinctions suggest that the term does not always do so. The 
Court noted that the prison officials at issue were, “albeit no longer of 
the rank and file, temporarily diverted from their usual duties,” 
subordinate to the warden who reviewed the decisions, and colleagues 
with the officer who lodges the charge and who will often provide 
testimony that the presiding official must review for credibility.287 
Many federal AJs have a similar hue. “[A]lbeit no longer part of the 
rank and file,” many AJs are not full-time hearing officers, they are 
subordinate to those more senior in the agency, and agency colleagues 
file charges and may serve as witnesses. On the other hand, absolute 
immunity may be available for AJs who have no other agency duties, 
who are supervised by those who do not enforce the matter or review 
the decision, and who preside over nonenforcement hearings that are 
unlikely to have colleagues bring charges or serve as witnesses. 
This immunity issue may have largely escaped agencies’ attention 
because, in the few cases to address the issue, courts ignore the 
“independence” inquiry. Some federal district courts have held that IJs 
are entitled to absolute immunity.288 But they have done so after 
quickly concluding only that the executive official acts in a quasi-
judicial function. They do not consider the “more important” inquiry, 
the IJs’ independence.289 Likewise, numerous courts have granted 
 
 285 See generally Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985). 
 286 Id. at 203-04. 
 287 Id. at 204. 
 288 See, e.g., Lyttle v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1290 (M.D. Ga. 2012) 
(“An immigration judge is protected by absolute immunity.” (citing Butz)); Alyshah v. 
Hunter, No. 1:06-cv-0931-TWT, 2006 WL 2644910, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 13, 2006); 
Hernandez-Ortez v. Godinez, No. 88 C 5925, 1988 WL 129997, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 
30, 1988). One decision stated without any analysis in dicta that “it is settled law that 
administrative judges and agency prosecutors are shielded by absolute immunity from 
claims arising from quasi-judicial administrative proceedings.” See Herbst v. U.S. 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., No. 98-civ-5533(LMM), 1999 WL 1052461, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1999). 
 289 See Butz, 438 U.S. at 483. 
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parole-board members absolute immunity,290 but, once again, without 
considering the “more important” inquiry.291 
This judicial preterition may be coming to an end. A recent 
challenge to the immunity of the U.S. Parole Commissioners led one 
prominent judge to call for denying them absolute immunity. In a 
concurring opinion in Taylor v. Reilly, D.C. Circuit Judge Brett 
Kavanaugh argued that absolute immunity was not available because 
the Parole Commissioners, as adjudicators who were removable at will 
by the President, were not independent.292 Other litigants have noticed 
Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion and are attempting to return the “more 
important” independence inquiry to the immunity analysis.293 A larger 
point for agencies is that they should carefully consider the power to 
remove executive officials at will as a useful tool for control; with 
control comes not only due process but also perhaps immunity 
concerns. Moreover, focusing on adjudicatory independence makes 
sense. To the extent that absolute immunity should be rare because of 
its power to immunize public actors who cause private harms, 
focusing on indicia of an impartial and fair adjudicatory process make 
agencies earn their great privilege by attempting to limit the instances 
in which the adjudicator would have incentive to harm private parties. 
As with judicial deference, one should not overstate the significance 
of absolute immunity for agencies. Immunity for agency adjudicators 
may be of marginal significance for many agencies. First, many 
agencies — unlike prisons — may be unlikely to encounter parties 
whose litigiousness renders absolute immunity especially valuable. 
Second, even if adjudicators have absolute immunity, the agency itself 
may still face discovery burdens because agency heads generally have 
only qualified immunity.294 That said, with the judicial reconsideration 
of which adjudicators should be absolutely immune and regulated 
parties’ interest in collateral lawsuits (perhaps especially in 
enforcement proceedings, where independence is especially 
 
 290 See, e.g., Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 200-01 (collecting appellate decisions). 
 291 See, e.g., Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828, 830-31 (8th Cir. 1983); Sellars v. 
Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1981). See generally United States ex rel. 
Powell v. Irving, 684 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1982) (ignoring independence in immunity 
analysis of parole board). 
 292 See Taylor v. Reilly, 685 F.3d 1110, 1117-18 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring).  
 293 See, e.g., Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia, 67 F. Supp. 3d 157, 165 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(noting the argument); Brief for Erica Hashimoto et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellant, Harris v. Fulwood, No. 13-5343 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 8, 2014) (arguing, based 
on Taylor, that parole hearing officers are not entitled to absolute immunity). 
 294 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 496-508 (1978). 
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valuable295),296 the use of ALJs allows agencies to limit disruptive 
litigation. 
B. Exaggerated Benefits of Choosing AJs 
Subpart A demonstrated that agencies give up benefits when they 
choose AJs to control agency proceedings. This subpart B argues that 
the remaining benefits of choosing AJs over ALJs are overstated. Not 
only are these benefits — cost savings, informality, and expertise — 
not as beneficial as they may first appear, but they lose their luster 
when compared to the benefits that ALJs provide. Nevertheless, where 
AJs provide benefits that ALJs do not, this subpart considers how the 
administrative state can bestow these benefits on agencies, even 
without congressional intervention. 
1. Overstated Cost Savings 
Perhaps most surprisingly, contrary to common perception, AJs are 
not always less expensive or, at least, significantly less expensive than 
ALJs.297 Three examples make the point. 
First, the 1992 Frye Survey reported that approximately 7% of all 
government-employed AJs (165) were paid either “supergrades” (i.e., 
GS-16 through GS-18) or were part of the Senior Executive Service 
(“SES”),298 which provide higher starting and capped salaries than 
ALJs receive.299 Ten years later, the Limon Updated Survey reported 
that SES pay grades are common throughout the administrative state, 
 
 295 VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1048-50 (arguing that independence is 
especially important in enforcement actions). 
 296 One commenter has expressly called for biased AJs to receive no immunity at 
all. See McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind, supra note 52, at 227 (“The ability of biased 
administrative judges to shape and distort the record must be curbed. Administrative 
judges found guilty of abusing their offices should enjoy no judicial immunity.”). 
 297 See, e.g., Kapnik, supra note 152, at 1544-45 (“AJs can cost significantly less 
than ALJs . . . .”); McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind, supra note 52, at 215 (“Because 
administrative judges are paid far less than administrative law judges, agencies prefer 
them . . . .”); Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1345 (“As a result, whereas the ALJs 
as a group rival the federal trial judiciary and adjuncts in both number and 
compensation, . . . [AJs] decide[] more cases, but do[] so with less prestige, 
compensation and job security.”). 
 298 See Frye, supra note 3, app. B. Some agencies did not report pay grades or the 
number of AJs who were paid at each grade. See id. at 349-51. 
 299 Pay & Leave, Salaries & Wages, Salary Table 2015-ES, OPM.GOV, 
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/ 
15Tables/exec/html/ES.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
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although it failed to indicate the number of AJs receiving SES pay.300 
Eleven of 36 agencies that conduct oral hearings with AJs (as listed in 
the Limon Updated Survey chart) reported having at least some AJs 
receiving SES pay.301 
Second, even of General Service AJs, at least approximately 8% were 
identified in the 1992 Frye Survey as GS-15 employees (the highest 
regular GS grade),302 whose salaries were only slightly lower than 
ALJs’.303 The Limon Updated Survey reveals that GS-15 pay is also 
common, although again without identifying the precise number of 
AJs at this grade. But importantly, the largest number of reported AJs 
from one agency on the Limon Updated Survey — 1,000 patent 
examiners that work in the Commerce Department — were GS-15,304 
constituting nearly one-third of all 3,370 reported AJs. 
Third, as leading scholars noted generally in the early 1990s,305 a 
growing number of AJs are paid on unique pay scales with pay that is 
commensurate to or better than ALJs’.306 For instance, Administrative 
Appeals Judges’ basic pay (“AA”) is identical to ALJs’.307 The more 
than 250 IJs308 have higher base salaries (“IJ”) than ALJs.309 Likewise, 
AJs with “Senior-Level and Scientific or Professional Positions” (“SL/
ST”)310 or AJs who serve as Administrative Patent Judges (“APJs”) 
 
 300 See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C at 1-6. 
 301 See id. 
 302 See Frye, supra note 3, app. B. Agencies reported 185 AJs as GS-15 employees 
(or approximately 8% of the 2,228 GS employees). Several other agencies submitted 
information indicating that their AJs were paid between various levels; three of those 
reporting agencies indicated that some unreported number of their AJs were GS-15.  
 303 GS-15 employees’ starting salaries are approximately $102,000, as compared to 
ALJs’ starting salaries of approximately $106,000. Compare 2015-GS Table, supra note 
170, with 2015-ALJ Table, supra note 167 (listing starting basic pay at $105,900). 
 304 See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C at 1 (under “U.S. Department of Commerce” 
entry). 
 305 VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1055-56. 
 306 See LIMON, supra note 13, at 3. 
 307 Compare Salary Table No. 2015-AAJ, OPM.GOV, http://www.opm.gov/policy-
data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/pdf/2015/AAJ.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2016), with 2015-ALJ Table, supra note 167. 
 308 Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ 
office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (“The Office of the 
Chief Immigration Judge . . . provides overall program direction . . . for approximately 
250 immigration judges in 57 immigration courts . . . .”). 
 309 Executive Office for Immigration Review, 2014 Immigration Judge Pay Rates, 
JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/05/28/2014IJ 
PayTable.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
 310 See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C at 1-6 (listing, for example, positions in the 
Department of the Interior and Health and Human Services). 
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receive basic pay that is significantly higher than ALJs’.311 But perhaps 
even more surprising, AJs on the Board of Contract Appeals — used in 
several agencies312 — and for OSHA313 have basic starting pay (CA-1–3 
and Executive Schedule (“EX”), respectively) that exceeds ALJs’ 
highest possible basic pay.314 
After accounting for AJs under the AA, APJ, CA, EX, GS-15315 or 
higher, IJ, SES, and SL/ST pay scales (in all of their bureaucratic, 
abbreviated glory), the cost-savings narrative surrounding AJs begins 
to lose force. For example, 1,618 of the 3,370 reported AJs — or 48% 
— are paid at levels better than, the same as, or only slightly lower 
than new ALJs.316 Moreover, this number only includes those AJs 
whom the agency identified as being paid at these grades. It does not 
include the numerous instances — more than 250 potentially affected 
AJs — in which the agency reported that some indefinite number of 
AJs was paid at these rates (and some indefinite number at lower 
rates).317 Accordingly, this data suggest that AJs may be meaningfully 
cheaper than ALJs only, at best, approximately half the time. 
 
 311 Compare Salary Table No. 2014-SL/ST, OPM.GOV, http://www.opm.gov/policy-
data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/pdf/2014/SLST.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2016) (listing basic pay minimum as $120,749 for SL/ST positions), and 
USPTO 2014 AD Pay Plan, COMMERCE.GOV, http://hr.commerce.gov/Employees/ 
Compensation/PROD01_010302 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (listing minimum salary 
for Administrative Patent Judges as $135,842), with 2015-ALJ Table, supra note 167 
(listing starting basic pay at approximately $106,000).  
 312 See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C at 1-6 (listing Board of Contract Appeals 
under Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Housing & Urban Development, Interior, 
Justice, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs; the General Service Administration; U.S. 
Government Printing Office; NASA; and U.S. Postal Service).  
 313 See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C at 5.  
 314 See Pay & Leave, Salaries & Wages, Salary Table No. 2015-BCA, OPM.GOV, 
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/ 
15Tables/exec/html/BCA.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (listing lowest basic pay for other 
Board of Contract Appeals members as $149,178); Pay & Leave, Salaries & Wages, Salary 
Table No. 2015-EX, OPM.GOV, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/ 
salaries-wages/salary-tables/15Tables/exec/html/EX.aspx (last visited July 22, 2015) (listing 
lowest basic pay as $148,700). 
 315 This account includes 25 AJs for the General Accounting Office’s Office of the 
General Counsel. The GAO reported “25-30” AJs who were paid at the “SG-15 
Equivalent.” See LIMON, supra note 13, app. C at 2. 
 316 See infra App. A (organizing data from Limon Updated Survey by pay grades 
described above). 
 317 See infra App. B (organizing data from Limon Updated Survey to isolate 
instances when agencies did not report indefinite number of AJs at high rates 
described above and calculating 268 relevant AJ positions (and 10 part-time 
positions)). 
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There’s more. The cost savings from paying the remaining 1,755 AJs 
— approximately half of all reported AJs — is not as significant as it 
may first appear. Of those remaining AJs, the reporting agencies 
identified the pay scale for 603 fulltime or “contract” AJs (as opposed 
to simply identifying that an AJ was part of the general service).318 
Assuming that each of the 603 AJs is paid at the lowest identified 
grade at 2015 rates (and thus assuming the largest possible — 
although unlikely — difference in cost between AJs and ALJs), the 
salary savings comes to less than $30 million or less than 1/37,000 of 
the 2015 $1.1 trillion discretionary budget.319 For some agencies, the 
increase is an infinitesimal fraction of their budgets. For instance, the 
Energy Department would pay less than $400,000 to convert its 19 AJs 
into ALJs or approximately 0.0015 of 1% of its 2014 budget of more 
than $27 billion.320 Even Veterans Affairs, which would have the 
largest additional costs of approximately $15,500,000 by converting to 
ALJs, would have to allocate only approximately 0.025 of 1% of its 
2014 budget of approximately $63 billion to increased salary costs. 
The only other agency with more than $3 million in additional costs in 
converting AJs to ALJs is the EEOC, with approximately $6 million.321 
Notably, many agencies — such as U.S. Railroad Retirement Board, 
 
 318 See infra App. C (organizing data from Limon Updated Survey by agencies with 
AJs at identifiable GS grades). I did not include those AJs for which the agencies 
simply identified them as being part of the General Service because it was too unclear 
what the AJs’ salaries were. 
 319 See Federal Spending: Where Does the Money Go, Discretionary Spending, 
NATIONALPRIORITIES.ORG, https://www.nationalpriorities.org/budget-basics/federal-budget-
101/spending (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
 320 Office of Management and Budget, Historical tables, Table 5.4, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
When calculating the cost savings, I used the starting base salary for ALJs of $105,900, 
as opposed to the approximate figure of $106,000 that I used throughout this article 
for ease of reference. See infra App. C. 
 321 A more recent budget analysis for the EEOC suggests that my figure for the 
EEOC is significantly larger than a more realistic projection. I arrived at this 
approximately $6 million figure based on the EEOC having 111 AJs and presuming 
that they were paid on the GS-11 scale. See infra App. C. The Administrative 
Conference of the United States considered in 2014 the likely budgetary effect if the 
EEOC converted its 95 AJs who hear certain federal-employee discrimination claims 
to ALJs. It predicted that “the agency’s annual personnel costs—in terms of salaries, 
benefits, and other related costs—would likely rise between $1.1 million and $2.5 
million in a given year over a ten-year period. Similarly, on an annualized basis, 
personnel costs increases from use of ALJs would likely be $2.1 million per year under 
the primary (baseline) scenario.” ACUS EEOC RPT., supra note 143, at 4. The report 
noted that almost all of the EEOC AJs were paid on the GS-14 scale. See id. at 43. 
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the Federal Maritime Commission, the EPA, and the Department of 
Energy — would have additional salary costs under $1 million.322 
This is not to say that cost savings are irrelevant. To paraphrase the 
late Senator Dirksen, “Twenty-nine million dollars here, twenty-nine 
million dollars there — pretty soon it adds up to real money.”323 But 
one must put this salary savings into perspective, not only with agency 
and federal discretionary spending but also with the benefits that ALJs 
bring to agencies. Likewise, this is not to say that the total savings 
could not be more than I indicate here once seniority and locality pay 
and benefits are accounted for, but, to my knowledge, this kind of 
granular data is not available. Moreover, this is not to say that AJs are 
always cheaper than ALJs; they’re not. The point is, instead, that one 
should not exaggerate the cost savings of AJs, especially in light of the 
benefits of converting, when possible, to ALJs. 
To be sure, the money for ALJ salaries would have to come from 
often-overtaxed agency budgets, meaning that money now spent on 
other things must instead be directed to ALJ salaries. Although cost is 
often relevant to due process, expense is not a trump card.324 Even if 
expense is germane to impartiality analysis,325 the amount of money at 
issue is comparatively small, as discussed above, and the expenditure 
furthers the compelling goals of protecting the agency forum from the 
unconstitutional appearance of partiality and ameliorating the agency’s 
ability to further its own agenda with less distraction. In other words, 
this movement of a comparatively modest amount of money to ALJs is 
not an empty expenditure. Moreover, I take no position on how high 
ALJ salaries should be. Perhaps, contrary to longstanding calls from 
ALJs,326 they should be lower. But Congress’s increased reliance on 
separate pay scales that exceed ALJ salaries for certain AJs and on GS-
15 salaries that are commensurate to ALJs’ salaries suggest that 
Congress has set appropriate salaries to attract qualified ALJs. 
 
 322 See App. C (organizing data from Limon Updated Survey by agencies with AJs 
at identifiable GS grades). 
 323 Scalia, supra note 43, at 69-70 (arguing that savings under prior ALJ-pay 
scheme, even if relatively modest, still supported adhering to it). 
 324 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970). 
 325 Although the court frequently considers costs when determining the extent of 
procedure that are due, see, e.g., id., I am not aware of the Court relying upon notions 
of cost when determining whether unconstitutional appearances of partiality exist. 
 326 See, e.g., Robin J. Arzt et al., Advancing the Judicial Independence and Efficiency of 
the Administrative Judiciary: A Report to the President-Elect of the United States, 29 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 93, 107-10 (2009). 
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2. Overstated Informality and Efficiency 
Agencies may also not gain as much informality and efficiency as it 
first appears by eschewing ALJs and formal adjudication under the 
APA. Formal adjudication generally requires an ALJ to preside over 
hearings327 and provides independence for the ALJ from ex parte 
comments, agency oversight, and the obligation to perform other 
agency duties.328 Participants are entitled to the following: notice of 
the proceedings,329 briefing,330 legal counsel,331 presentation of their 
case orally or in writing (except that agencies can require written 
submissions in certain benefits and licensing matters), cross-
examination as necessary,332 submission of findings of fact and law, 
submission of exceptions to findings, and a reasoned decision with 
findings of material facts and legal issues supported by substantial 
evidence in the record as a whole.333 For three key reasons, these 
attributes of formal adjudication are unlikely to interfere significantly 
with agency efficiency. 
First. Because many agency hearings are already formalized, 
additional APA requirements for formal adjudication may minimally 
affect efficiency. As a starting point, oral hearings, by their nature, are 
very likely to include many characteristics of formal adjudication, 
including notice, written and oral presentation of one’s case, legal 
counsel, and reasoned, written opinions. Indeed, Frye noted more 
than twenty years ago that agencies have moved to more formalized 
proceedings in federal-employment and enforcement matters that 
incorporate numerous formal-adjudication procedures,334 and ACUS 
noted in 1992, when attempting to convince Congress to require 
formal adjudication in more proceedings,335 that “informal hearings 
 
 327 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2012). 
 328 Id. §§ 554(d), 557(d) (2012). 
 329 Id. § 554(b). 
 330 Id. § 554(c). 
 331 Id. § 555(b) (2012). 
 332 Id. § 556(d). 
 333 Id. §§ 557(c), 556(d), 706(2)(E) (2012). 
 334 See Frye, supra note 3, at 333 (discussing increased formality in federal-
employment disputes); id. at 275 (“All [immigration, passport-and-nationality, and 
security-clearance cases] incorporate a substantial number of the procedural 
protections of sections 556 and 557.”). 
 335 VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1058-59 (“Congress should consider expanding 
the category of cases where ALJs are required . . . . Congress should focus on the 
following factors: (1) Whether the cases heard and decided by the AJs involve 
potentially serious curtailment of individual interests (‘Serious curtailment of 
individual interests’ should be defined to include those cases that include penalties, 
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contain most of the ingredients of an APA formal hearing.”336 As one 
of many examples, immigration proceedings had adopted “most of 
[formal adjudication’s] procedures,” including even separation of 
functions to provide IJs some independence.337 Likewise, the 
Department of Interior’s Office of Hearings and Appeals decades ago 
recognized the value of giving their AJs separate space and separated 
functions from others in the agency,338 and agencies have moved to 
give more independence and sole-adjudicative function to AJs with 
high caseloads.339 In other examples, the Department of Defense 
provides nearly formal adjudication for those facing the denial of 
security clearance,340 and the Department of Agriculture uses very 
formal proceedings (satisfying all or nearly all of the ingredients 
mentioned in Goldberg v. Kelly, and essentially the same as formal 
adjudication) in several adjudications.341 
Relatedly, using ALJs with more indicia of impartiality can also 
increase efficiency and cost-reducing efforts. Providing a more 
impartial tribunal “may reduce . . . the demand . . . for additional 
procedural ingredients such as confrontation, a transcript, and oral 
presentation.”342 Parties, too, may be less likely to seek appeal of 
adverse decisions when the decision is reasoned, addresses material 
arguments, and comes from an impartial decision-maker. 
To be sure, the transition would not be nearly costless in every 
instance. As other studies have demonstrated,343 the administrative 
state is balkanized with numerous varieties of hearings, although the 
trend is towards increased formality. Some adjudications may have 
exceptional need to exploit certain values that are anathema to formal 
adjudication, such as the need for ex parte contacts in matters of 
 
sanctions, or other significant restrictions on personal freedom.’)”). ACUS had 
recommended that Congress require cases concerning “substantial impact on personal 
liberties or freedom,” “criminal-like culpability,” “sanctions with substantial economic 
effect,” or findings of discrimination use formal adjudication. 1992 ACUS RPT., supra 
note 49, at 12. 
 336 VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1053-54. 
 337 Frye, supra note 3, at 276 (listing procedures created by statute and regulation). 
 338 See Verkuil, Informal Adjudication, supra note 35, at 787 (citing interviews with 
Interior’s Office of Hearings and Appeals). 
 339 See Frye, supra note 3, at 271. 
 340 See id. at 279. 
 341 See Verkuil, Informal Adjudication, supra note 35, at 760-65. 
 342 Id. at 751 (citing Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 
1267, 1279, 1289 (1975)).  
 343 See generally Frye, supra note 3 (discussing in significant detail the kinds of AJ 
adjudication); see also VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 843-75; Verkuil, Informal 
Adjudication, supra note 35, at 757-79. 
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national security or much more limited oral-hearing rights when 
matters of high volume and low complexity can be handled equally as 
fairly in writing (and do not otherwise fall under the APA’s written-
hearing exception for benefits and licensing). (Yet, even here, agencies 
can work to provide these necessary AJs with independence with 
protection from at-will removal and separation of functions.) Or 
Congress may, in extremely rare circumstances, already provide 
certain AJs, such as the judges on the Civilian Board of Contract 
Appeals, with similar accoutrements of independence that ALJs have, 
significantly reducing any lingering concerns over limits on other APA 
on-the-record protections.344 Or certain, rare agency hearings for 
which parties can seek completely de novo judicial proceedings may 
gain little from formalized proceedings.345 Likewise, some agencies 
may not have the discretion under their enabling acts to choose formal 
adjudication and ALJs, such as when Congress has created a unique 
adjudicatory process and named adjudicators like “Immigration 
Judges” or “Administrative Patent Judges.” Those agencies would need 
to not only consider the benefits of formal adjudication and ALJs, but 
also seek congressional authorization to hire ALJs. And moving to 
formal adjudication will certainly have some limited transition costs, 
but these are short-term and unlikely to prove onerous for agencies 
that have already moved towards formalized proceedings. My point 
here is not that agencies should or can choose formal adjudication in 
every case. Instead, my point is that in numerous cases, the move to 
formal adjudication — as others have previously requested, to no 
avail, that Congress require346 — is not as onerous or inefficient as 
agencies may reactively contend. 
Second. Formal adjudication is not as strict as it sounds. As Bill 
Funk has pointed out, despite agencies’ protestations that formal 
adjudication is “too costly and time consuming, . . . no empirical 
support [exists for] . . . such an indictment of APA adjudication.”347 
 
 344 See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 7105(b) (2012) (providing judges on the Civilian Board of 
Contract Appeals the same appointment and removal protections as ALJs). Although 
these judges must be “selected and appointed to serve in the same manner” as ALJs, 
id., agencies have interpreted this statutory language as to permit them (not the OPM) 
to use procedures similar to those of the OPM to select ALJs. See VERKUIL ET AL., supra 
note 3, at 950-51. The OPM, for its part, has indicated that it does not have authority 
to appoint these judges.  
 345 See, e.g., ACUS EEOC RPT., supra note 143, at 13-14 (considering certain EEOC 
hearings for federal employees that are subject to de novo judicial proceedings and 
noting the APA’s exception from formal adjudication for de novo proceedings). 
 346 See VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1058-59. 
 347 Funk, Wong Yang Sung, supra note 35, at 892. 
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The APA permits flexibility in formal adjudication.348 For instance, 
agencies generally can set pleading rules,349 regulate amici,350 enter 
consent decrees,351 grant summary judgment,352 limit depositions,353 
compel meaningful settlement conferences,354 grant ALJs other 
authority to assist with case management,355 exclude “irrelevant, 
immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence,”356 limit cross-
examination, engage in ex parte contacts for certain matters,357 limit 
hearings to written submissions in certain high-volume matters 
(claims for money or benefits, and applications for initial licenses),358 
and even forgo adversarial (as opposed to inquisitorial) hearings with 
lawyers for both private parties and the government.359 Frye — who 
served as both an AJ and an ALJ — opined that the only significant 
power that agencies surrender is the ability to compile the formal 
record that must support the final agency order.360 At legislative 
hearings concerning SSA adjudication, law professor Victor 
Rosenblum testified on a point that agencies (and perhaps courts) 
have forgotten: “[t]he focus of the APA was not on judicialization but 
on fairness and impartiality in wielding administrative skills and 
responsibilities.”361 
Third. Transferring hearing duties from AJs with other duties to 
ALJs with no other duties does not mean that the ALJs will be 
underutilized. Recall that some AJs have other duties, suggesting that 
 
 348 See id. 
 349 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3) (2012). 
 350 See id. § 554(c). 
 351 See id. § 554(c)(2). 
 352 See id. § 554(e); see also William Funk, Close Enough for Government Work? — 
Using Informal Procedures for Imposing Administrative Penalties, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1, 65 (1993). 
 353 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(4) (2012). 
 354 See id. § 556(c)(6), (c)(8). 
 355 See id. § 556(c)(11). 
 356 See id. § 556(d). 
 357 See id. § 554(d)(2). 
 358 See id. § 556(d). 
 359 See Wolfe, supra note 138, at 218 (citing SUBCOMM. ON SOC. SEC. OF THE COMM. 
ON WAYS & MEANS, 96TH CONG., SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: SURVEY 
AND ISSUE PAPER 8 (Comm. Print 1979)) (discussing views of then-Director of the 
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (for social-security claims), Robert Trachtenberg, that 
APA does not require adversarial hearings or “highly ‘judicialized’ hearing[s]”). 
 360 Frye, supra note 3, at 268 n.14.  
 361 Wolfe, supra note 138, at 218 (citing SUBCOMM. ON SOC. SEC. OF THE COMM. ON 
WAYS & MEANS, 96TH CONG., SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: SURVEY AND 
ISSUE PAPER 8-9 (Comm. Print 1979)). 
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the agency does not have a sufficient number of hearings to keep them 
occupied with hearings alone. But this concern can be largely 
addressed in two ways. For agencies that have more than one 
employee with shared duties, agencies can consolidate the hearing 
responsibilities so that fewer employees have hearing duties. Swapping 
those employees with ALJs would lead to only whatever additional 
costs arise from pay costs, if any, and any additional or new costs 
associated with reimbursing the OPM for administering the ALJ exam 
(which are not otherwise offset by the agency’s cost savings in having 
the OPM handle hiring).362 For agencies whose low number of 
hearings warrants only a part-time ALJ,363 Congress permits those 
agencies to share ALJs for occasional or temporary use.364 
Accordingly, the case for informality and inefficiency is not as 
strong as may be supposed. With the already formalized nature of 
many agency proceedings, the APA’s flexibility, and strategies for 
hiring only as many ALJs as necessary, formal adjudication is not 
agencies’ bête noir. 
3. Overstated Expertise 
Although agencies’ reliance on expertise to justify AJs is, like other 
agency arguments, overwrought, it provides their best argument. As to 
the overwrought point, ALJs are not as inexpert as agencies may think. 
ALJs gain expertise on the job. The idea of committing ALJs to 
particular agencies (instead of creating an ALJ Corps, as some states 
have) is to permit them to gain expertise in a particular agency’s 
regulatory regime.365 Learning statutory and regulatory schemes 
 
 362 See 5 C.F.R. § 930.203 (2015) (“Each agency employing [ALJs] must reimburse 
OPM for the cost of developing and administering the [ALJ] examination. Each 
agency is charged a pro rata share of the examination cost, based on the actual 
number of [ALJs] the agency employs.”). In 2012, the OPM assessed agencies a fee of 
$1,633 per ALJ employed. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
CONG. RESPONSE RPT., INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS WITH THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL 
MANAGEMENT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE SERVICES 6 (2013), available at 
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-05-12-22144.pdf. 
 363 Frye noted in his study that, with the exception of certain Veteran Affairs 
officers who were not included in the Limon Updated Survey, “while the caseload of 
presiding officers with other duties is significant, the tendency to limit their 
responsibilities to case types with a low caseload is pronounced.” Frye, supra note 3, 
at 270. The Limon Updated Survey, contrary to the 1992 Frye Survey, did not identify 
the number of AJs with other duties. 
 364 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (2012). 
 365 See VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1042-44 (discussing virtues and vices of the 
ALJ-corps model). 
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relatively quickly is not new for lawyers and judges, and generalist 
ALJs can rely on lawyers (who very likely appear in most oral hearings 
and file most briefings) to guide them. Recall, too, that ALJs are 
evaluated based on their legal experience and must pass an 
examination to qualify for the list of three, indicating that they are 
intelligent, seasoned lawyers who can learn a regulatory regime 
quickly.366 In fact, in one of the recent challenges to SEC ALJs, the 
district court noted that the ALJ at issue has a “distinguished 
biography,” including earning his undergraduate degree in physics 
from Yale, earning his law degree from Harvard Law School, serving as 
a federal law clerk, serving as an Assistant United States Attorney, and 
working in an intellectual-property private practice.367 This ALJ may 
not be atypical because others have noted, decades ago, that the ALJ 
corps “in education, training, and experience . . . [is] no less qualified 
than bankruptcy judges and magistrates, if not members of the federal 
bench.”368 
Not all agency adjudications, moreover, would appear to require 
significant technical expertise that cannot be learned on the job. For 
instance, agriculture, employment and labor, education, social-
security, and veterans cases do not seem to require significant 
technical expertise that a successful lawyer could not acquire relatively 
quickly. Indeed, the SSA and HHS have noted that they have generally 
been pleased with their ALJ candidates.369 To the extent that limited 
technical expertise is necessary, the APA provides numerous ways of 
providing it to the ALJ: oral hearings, expert witnesses, and party 
agreement and proposed factual findings. If additional regulatory 
expertise is needed, lawyers can assist the ALJ in framing the issues 
and providing technical background. 
Nonetheless, some agency adjudications will greatly benefit from 
adjudicators with significant technical or regulatory expertise. For 
instance, patent and tax matters — two of the areas that had the 
 
 366 See id. at 1044 (“After a few years’ experience, [ALJs] are well-positioned to 
understand and to apply the complicated maze of statutes, regulations, and agency 
policies that govern the disputes they adjudicate.”). 
 367 Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 387 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).  
 368 Verkuil, Reflections, supra note 3, at 1344. 
 369 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-14, RESULTS-ORIENTED 
CULTURES: OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SHOULD REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGE PROGRAM TO IMPROVE HIRING AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 8-10 (2010) 
[hereinafter GAO-10-14] (reporting that SSA and Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) were pleased with quality of ALJ candidates, although they sought changes 
— such as by awarding bonus points to eligible candidates — to ensure that the 
appointment considered specialized knowledge). 
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largest number of AJs in Limon’s Updated Survey — are not for the 
uninitiated or even for those without certain hard-science 
undergraduate degrees. The problem for agencies that need expert 
adjudicators is that the OPM’s current ALJ-hiring model does not 
account for subject-matter expertise.370 For decades, OPM routinely 
permitted “selective certification,” which allowed agencies to hire 
candidates with technical expertise who qualified as eligible but were 
not within the top-three scoring candidates.371 But it has refused to do 
so since the early 1980s, likely because of concerns that agencies were 
seeking to hire ALJs with a more “pro-enforcement attitude.”372 The 
result of selective certification’s desuetude is that it unintentionally 
furthered concerns of adjudicator bias: agencies were further 
incentivized to turn away from generalist ALJs in favor of technically 
expert AJs, groomed as part of the agency’s own staff and within the 
agency’s continued control.373 
Certain agencies continue to request selective certification — from 
the OPM or Congress — in vain.374 ALJs, for their part, have 
 
 370 See Asimow, supra note 25, at 1009 (“[The ALJ-hiring process] does not 
[account for] whether a new ALJ has specialized experience in the regulatory or 
beneficiary scheme administered by the agency.”); Eaglesham, In-House Court, supra 
note 149 (quoting report stating that the SEC “has not hired a single [ALJ] who had 
directly relevant experience or expertise related to the federal securities laws” in thirty 
years); Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Déjà 
Vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 484 (2007) 
(noting that agencies cannot seek out candidates with experience). 
 371 See BURROWS, supra note 56, at 5; Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges, 
supra note 58, at 117.  
 372 OPM, EXAMINATION ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 318 at 8 (1984); see also 5 C.F.R. 
§ 332.404 (2015) (requiring agency to select from the “highest three eligibles”). The 
concern of agencies stacking their ALJ corps with former staffers was very real. A 1969 
ACUS report found that during one five-year period, “52 of 66 ALJs appointed by the 
agencies utilizing selective certification had been previously employed on the staffs of 
those agencies.” Christopher E. Austin, Note, Due Process, Court Access Fees, and the 
Right to Litigate, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 768, 785 n.103 (1982) (quoting ADMIN. 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEARINGS: STATISTICAL 
REPORT FOR 1976–1978, at 12 (1980)). 
 373 Cf. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication, supra note 147, at 75-76 (arguing that agencies 
would be even more likely to avoid ALJs if the ALJ-corps model were adopted because 
ALJs would not be assigned to particular agencies). 
 374 See BURROWS, supra note 56, at 6 (noting that International Trade Commission 
(“ITC”) and the SSA have sought selective certification); Arzt et al., supra note 326, at 
101-02 (noting that the ITC and the Federal Trade Commission both sought legislative 
permission to certify selectively). But see GAO-10-14, supra note 369, at 8-10 (reporting 
that SSA and HHS were pleased with the quality of ALJ candidates, although they sought 
changes — such as by awarding bonus points to eligible candidates — to ensure that the 
appointment considered specialized knowledge); Social Security Testimony Before 
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continued to oppose selective certification and sought to retain their 
generalist hue.375 But this stalemate over selective certification is not 
inevitable. A more limited form of selective certification can 
adequately address both sides’ concerns. 
To account for necessary technical expertise, the OPM should first 
permit selective certification if the agency can make a showing that 
technical expertise (meaning expertise in the industry, science, or 
comparatively complicated regulatory regime) is necessary for ALJs. A 
good starting place would be those instances in which Congress has 
itself generally indicated some form of specialized expertise in 
hiring376 or specialized adjudication for the subject matter at issue 
outside of the agencies themselves: tax (Article I Tax Court), 
government contracts (Article I Court of Federal Claims and Federal 
Circuit jurisdiction), patent (Federal Circuit jurisdiction), military 
matters (United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Services), and 
Trade (Article III Court of International Trade). This congressional 
confirmation provides an objective, clear basis for determining 
whether expertise is a compelling value in the particular subject area 
at issue, and thus it should limit OPM and ALJs’ concerns of agencies 
seeking biased ALJs when expertise is not necessary for the 
adjudications at issue. 
To account for fears of agency in-house hiring, OPM should limit the 
selective registers to require balance among the agency’s ALJ force. 
OPM, for example, could require that no more than, say, 25% of the 
agency’s ALJ corps have previously worked within the agency. Such a 
balancing requirement is similar to the partisan balancing requirements 
that are ubiquitous throughout the federal administrative state377 and 
that apply to European constitutional courts.378 This balancing 
 
Congress: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, Subcomm. on Soc. Sec., & the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on the Courts, Commercial and Administrative Law, 
114th Cong. (July 11, 2011) (statement of Michael J. Astrue, Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.), 
available at http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_071111.html (noting SSA’s 
“positive working relationship with OPM” and the improved quality of hiring, but still 
seeking “agency-specific selection criteria”).  
 375 See Arzt et al., supra note 326, at 103; Eaglesham, In-House Court, supra note 
149 (quoting Erin Wirth, president of the Fed. Admin. Law Judges Conference, as 
arguing that ALJs are generalists who do not need expertise in their fields).  
 376 See 41 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(2) (2012) (requiring that certain members of the Board 
of Contract Appeals have “at least 5 years of experience in public contract law”). 
 377 See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. et al., Partisan Balance Requirements in the 
Age of New Formalism, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 941, 962-72 (2015).  
 378 See Mary L. Volvansek, Appointing Judges the European Way, 34 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 363, 384 (2007) (“European constitutional courts, whose judges are named 
through shared appointments and a balance of partisan quotas, were created in 
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requirement recognizes that agency employees have useful expertise 
and experience, that they may be extremely able neutrals, and that 
agency service should not disincentivize those with expertise and 
adjudicatory aspirations from working for agencies. The other ALJs can 
come from lawyers that regularly appear before the agency and lawyers 
from other agencies.379 If agencies still eschew ALJ hiring under such a 
balancing regime, it only causes their argument for expertise to look like 
subterfuge for bias. 
To be sure, some employee-nepotism may remain, but the concern 
should be mitigated. The in-house employees must still qualify 
through their test scores as “eligible,”380 although they must no longer 
be within the top three scores.381 Likewise, a balancing requirement 
may be most effective with multimember bodies, where members 
exchange views and vote on policy matters, instead of single-judge 
proceedings. But a balancing requirement can have a salutary effect on 
agency culture and nonbinding ALJ precedent. The supermajority of 
ALJs from outside of the agency can be expected to create an impartial 
judicial culture in which the former in-house employees (now with 
protection from at-will removal) are integrated, much as it is within 
the judicial branch when former prosecutors, public defenders, 
plaintiff’s lawyers, and defense attorneys become neutrals.382 
Moreover, the ALJs from outside of the agency should have an 
outsized effect on agency precedent. Even if that precedent is not 
binding on other ALJs,383 it provides persuasive precedent that other 
ALJs will either attempt to remain consistent with or attempt to 
distinguish — all similar to how federal district judges within the 
same district interact with one another and consider each other’s 
nonbinding decisions. 
This proposal does not require congressional intervention. Like 
most agencies’ discretion under Chevron to choose ALJs and formal 
adjudication, the OPM can reinstate selective certification on its own. 
 
recognition of the fact that politics and judicial decision-making may not be wholly 
divorced.”). 
 379 See VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 880 (noting that in a 1992 ALJ survey 36.8% 
of respondents classified their “primary professional experience as private practice”). 
 380 See Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges, supra note 58, at 114 
(discussing eligibility requirements to be placed on candidate register). 
 381 See id. at 117-18. 
 382 See Ranier Knopff, The Politics of Reforming Judicial Appointments, 58 U.N.B. L.J. 
44, 49 (2008). 
 383 See Isaac D. Benkin & Jason Schlosberg, Practice in FAA Civil Penalty 
Proceedings, 21 AIR & SPACE L. 10, 13 (2006) (noting that one ALJ’s decision is not 
binding on colleagues but may prove persuasive).  
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The OPM has statutory authority to “prescribe regulations” related to, 
among other things, ALJ hiring.384 The agency’s past, longstanding use 
of selective certification strongly suggests its propriety, and I am not 
aware of any challenge to that authority. Thus, unlike prior proposals 
for selective certification, this compromise proposal should largely 
address both sides’ concerns.385 OPM, for its part, should gain power 
by giving up some selection criteria to certain agencies for certain 
adjudications. If agencies increasingly choose ALJs, the OPM gains a 
meaningful role in the hiring of more ALJs. 
But the return to a modified selective certification is merely a 
beginning. Congress and the OPM have too long ignored other 
problems with ALJ hiring386 that must be fixed if agencies are to view 
OPM-led hiring as a worthwhile price for improved adjudication. 
First, Congress should repeal or substantially limit the Veterans’ 
Preference for ALJ candidates, which significantly increases the odds 
of veterans’ inclusion in the list of three candidates from which 
agencies must choose.387 As others have noted for decades, it limits 
diversity within the ALJ corps and can lead to a less-experienced and 
less qualified corps.388 Second, Congress should provide the OPM 
more guidance on its responsiveness to agencies’ requests for 
additional ALJs and provide a faster hiring process that is more 
receptive to agency requests for ALJ hiring. One way to help this is for 
the OPM to reopen and adequately staff its ALJ Office, which it closed 
in 2003.389 The Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference also 
has a significant — and self-interested — role to play in 
recommending improvements to the ALJ-hiring process to render it 
more attractive to agencies, even if these improvements may affect the 
perceived prestige of the corps. Ultimately, with the benefits that ALJs 
 
 384 5 U.S.C. § 1305 (2012). 
 385 See, e.g., VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1061-62. 
 386 See, e.g., 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 49 (listing recommendations to ALJ-
hiring and the ALJ-evaluation processes). 
 387 ALJs and agencies dislike the preference because adding additional points based 
on veteran status can significantly affect the final list of candidates. See Lubbers, 
Federal Administrative Law Judges, supra note 58, 115-16 (“Since there is only a 20-
point spread on scores among all ALJ eligibles (from 80 to 100), the addition of 5 to 
10 veterans preference points to any score can change by many places an eligible’s 
ranking on the register.”). 
 388 See, e.g., id. (describing how preference (1) substantially impacts eligible 
candidates’ ordering because the scores have only a twenty-point range and (2) limits 
the number of women candidates). 
 389 See Arzt et al., supra note 326, at 105-06 (criticizing OPM’s closure of its ALJ 
office). 
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provide, the focus should be on increasing the political pressure for 
Congress and the OPM to make these changes, not further limiting the 
appointment of ALJs. 
CONCLUSION 
The time for agencies to reconsider their use of AJs is now. Forty 
percent of IJs — one of the most controversial groups of AJs — are 
nearing retirement this year.390 The high number of retirements 
provides a meaningful opportunity to reconsider the problems with 
immigration proceedings and the AJs who oversee these hearings. The 
SEC has provided a cautionary tale of the legal and public-relations 
fallout that occurs when agencies are caught flat-footed responding to 
fairness concerns in their administrative proceedings. Nevertheless, 
agencies continue to prefer AJs, as the SSA’s very recent call to transfer 
certain administrative appeals from ALJs to AJs demonstrates.391 
As agencies move to formal adjudication with ALJs, they further a 
collateral virtue. They reduce the “unfortunate balkanization of 
hearing procedures [that] defeats the purpose of the drafters of the 
APA who wished to achieve greater uniformity and to prescribe basic 
fair hearing norms across the federal administrative establishment.”392 
This last point is important. Contrary to earlier focus on congressional 
action to improve administrative adjudication, this Article has 
demonstrated that agencies themselves can help create those fair, more 
uniform proceedings in most cases. And this Article demonstrates that 
a fair hearing is not only in the interest of regulated parties. It is in 
agencies’ interest, too. 
  
 
 390 See Rachel Glickhouse, Immigration Judges Are Burning Out Faster than Prison 
Wardens and Hospital Doctors, QZ.COM (Aug. 3, 2015), http://qz.com/469923/there-
are-only-250-immigration-judges-in-the-united-states (“But there are only 250 
immigration judges in the US, and this year, 100 judges are up for retirement.”). 
 391 Telephone Interview with Admin. Law Judge William A. Wenzel, Vice President 
of Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges (Mar. 17, 2016). The Association of Administrative 
Law Judges contends that the SSA’s own regulations require ALJs to preside over these 
appeals. 
 392 Asimow, supra note 25, at 1006 (citing ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 9 (1947)); see also Funk, Wong Yang Sung, supra note 
35, at 892 (“The elimination of any unified concept of a hearing on the record has 
resulted in each agency crafting its own adjudicatory procedure ‘good for this day and 
train only.’” (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting))). 
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APPENDIX A. GRADES GS-15 OR ABOVE 
Agency Office 
Number 
of 
Hearing 
Officials 
Title of 
Position 
GS, SES 
or Other 
Pay Plan 
2015 
Lowest 
GS 
Level 
Basic 
Pay 
Total Cost 
based on 
2002 
Numbers 
with 2015 
Salaries 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Labor 
Benefits 
Review 
Board 5 
Admini-
strative 
Appeals 
Judge AA 105,900 
Social 
Security 
Admini-
stration 
Appeals 
Counsel 25 
Admini-
strative 
Appeals 
Judge AA 105,900 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Energy 
Energy 
Board of 
Contract 
Appeals 3 
Admini-
strative 
Judge CA 149,178   
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
the 
Interior 
Board of 
Contract 
Appeals 1 
Contract 
Board 
Chair CA-01 158,700   
U.S. 
Govern-
ment 
Printing 
Office 
Board of 
Contract 
Appeals 1 
Admini-
strative 
Judge CA-1 149,178   
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Agricul-
ture 
Board of 
Contract 
Appeals 4 
Admini-
strative 
Judge CA-1-3 149,178   
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Defense 
Armed 
Services 
Board of 
Contract 
Appeals 30 
Admini-
strative 
Judge CA-1-3 149,178   
U.S. 
General 
Services 
Admini-
stration 
Board of 
Contract 
Appeals 8 
Board 
Judge CA-1-3 149,178   
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Agency Office 
Number 
of 
Hearing 
Officials 
Title of 
Position 
GS, SES 
or Other 
Pay Plan 
2015 
Lowest 
GS 
Level 
Basic 
Pay 
Total Cost 
based on 
2002 
Numbers 
with 2015 
Salaries 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Housing 
& Urban 
Develop-
ment 
Board of 
Contract 
Appeals 3 
Admini-
strative 
Judge CA-1-3 149,178   
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Transport
-ation 
Board of 
Contract 
Appeals 3 
Admini-
strative 
Judge CA-1-3 149,178   
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Veterans 
Affairs 
Board of 
Contract 
Appeals 6 
Admini-
strative 
Judge CA-1-3 149,178   
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
the 
Interior 
Board of 
Contract 
Appeals 1 
Contract 
Board 
Vice 
Chair CA-02 153,939   
U.S. 
Occupa-
tional 
Safety & 
Health 
Review 
Commis-
sion 
Office of 
the 
Chairman 
and Office 
of the 
Commis-
sioner 3 Member EX 148,700   
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Com-
merce 
Board or 
Patent 
Appeals 
and 
Interfer-
ences 20 
Legal 
Exami-
ner GS-15 101,630 2,032,600 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Com-
merce 
Board or 
Patent 
Appeals 
and 
Interfer-
ences 1,000 
Patent 
Examin-
er GS-15 101,630 101,630,000 
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Agency Office 
Number 
of 
Hearing 
Officials 
Title of 
Position 
GS, SES 
or Other 
Pay Plan 
2015 
Lowest 
GS 
Level 
Basic 
Pay 
Total Cost 
based on 
2002 
Numbers 
with 2015 
Salaries 
U.S. 
Commod-
ity 
Futures 
Trading 
Commis-
sion 
Office of 
Proceed-
ings 2 
Judg-
ment 
Officer GS-15 101,630 203,260 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Defense 
Defense 
Legal 
Services 
Office 17 
Admin-
istrative 
Judge GS-15 101,630 1,727,710 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Defense 
Defense 
Office of 
Hearings 
and 
Appeals 16 
Admini-
strative 
Judge GS-15 101,630 1,626,080 
Environ-
mental 
Protec-
tion 
Agency 
Office of 
Enforce-
ment and 
Compli-
ance 
Assurance 1 
Hearing 
Officer GS-15 101,630 101,630 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
the 
Interior 
Office of 
Hearings 
and 
Appeals 4 
Indian 
Probate 
Judge GS-15 101,630 406,520 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Justice 
Drug 
Enforce-
ment 
Admini-
stration 2 
Deciding 
Official GS-15 101,630 203,260 
U.S. 
Small 
Business 
Admini-
stration 
Office of 
Hearings 
and 
Appeals 2 
Admini-
strative 
Judge GS-15 101,630 203,260 
U.S. Air 
Force 
Board for 
Correc-
tion for 
Military 
Records 70 
Panel 
Chair 
Panel 
Member 
GS-15 
and 
Above 101,630 7,114,100 
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Agency Office 
Number 
of 
Hearing 
Officials 
Title of 
Position 
GS, SES 
or Other 
Pay Plan 
2015 
Lowest 
GS 
Level 
Basic 
Pay 
Total Cost 
based on 
2002 
Numbers 
with 2015 
Salaries 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Com-
merce 
Trade-
mark 
Trial and 
Appeals 
Board 15 
Admini-
strative 
Trade-
mark 
Judge 
SES-4 
GS-15 101,630 1,524,450 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Education 
Office of 
Hearings 
and 
Appeals 3 
Admini-
strative 
Judge 
SES-6 
GS-15 101,630 304,890 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Labor 
Employee 
Compen-
sation 
Appeals 
Board 7 
Chair-
man 
Mem-
bers 
Alter-
nates (4) 
SL  
GS-15 101,630 711,410 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Justice 
Board of 
Immigra-
tion 
Appeals 19 
Board 
Member-
Appel-
lant 
Immi-
gration 
Judge IJ 109,970 2,089,430 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Justice 
Executive 
Office for 
Immigra-
tion 
Review/
Office of 
the Chief 
Immigra-
tion Judge 228 
Immi-
gration 
Judge IJ 1-4 109,970 25,073,160 
U.S. 
Nuclear 
Regula-
tory 
Commis-
sion 
Office of 
the 
General 
Counsel 8 
Admini-
strative 
Judge 
Level A: 
SES-1-3
Level B: 
SES-3 
Level C: 
SES-4 121,956 975,648 
Environ-
mental 
Protec-
tion 
Agency 
Office of 
Enforce-
ment and 
Compli-
ance 
Assurance 4 
Envi-
ron-
mental 
Appeals 
Board 
Judge SES 121,956 487,824 
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Agency Office 
Number 
of 
Hearing 
Officials 
Title of 
Position 
GS, SES 
or Other 
Pay Plan 
2015 
Lowest 
GS 
Level 
Basic 
Pay 
Total Cost 
based on 
2002 
Numbers 
with 2015 
Salaries 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Justice 
Drug 
Enforce-
ment 
Admini-
stration 1 
Deputy 
Admini-
stration SES 121,956 121,956 
National 
Founda-
tion on 
the Arts 
and 
Humani-
ties 
National 
Endow-
ment for 
the 
Humani-
ties 1 
Chair-
man SES 121,956 121,956 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Health & 
Human 
Services 
Depart-
mental 
Appeals 
Board 5 
Board 
Member 
SES 
SL 121,956 609,780 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
the 
Interior 
Office of 
Hearings 
and 
Appeals 12 
Admini-
strative 
Judge SL-00 121,956 1,463,472 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
the 
Interior 
Office of 
Hearings 
and 
Appeals 1 
Attorney 
Examin-
er SL-00 121,956 121,956 
General 
Accoun-
ting 
Office 
Office of 
the 
General 
Counsel 25 
Senior 
Attorney 
or 
Assistant 
General 
Counsel 
(25-30) 
Pay 
Banding 
(GS-15 
Equiv.) 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Com-
merce 
Board or 
Patent 
Appeals 
and 
Interfer-
ences 62 
Admini-
strative 
Patent 
Judge 
Admn. 
Deter-
mined 135,842 8,422,204 
Sum of 
Hearing 
Officials 1,618 
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APPENDIX B. ISOLATED HIGH-PAID AJS 
Agency Office 
Number 
of 
Hearing 
Officials 
Title of 
Position 
GS, 
SES 
or 
Other 
Pay 
Plan 
2015 
Lowest GS 
Level Basic 
Pay 
Total Cost 
based on 
2002 
Numbers 
with 2015 
Salaries 
U.S. 
Interna-
tional 
Trade 
Commis-
sion 
Office of 
the 
Secretary 6 
Com-
mission-
er 
EX 
SES 
GS 
U.S. 
Army 
Army 
Board 
for 
Correc-
tion for 
Military 
Records 100 
Chair-
person 
Board 
Member 
GS 
SES 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Health & 
Human 
Services 
Food 
and 
Drug 
Admini-
stration 4 
Presi-
ding 
Officer 
(Part 
Time) 
SES 
GS 
Pension 
Benefit 
Guaranty 
Corpora-
tion 
Appeals 
Board 4 
Appeals 
Board 
Member
Appeals 
Board 
Chair-
man 
SL 
GS 
U.S. 
Railroad 
Retire-
ment 
Board 
Bureau 
of 
Hearings 
and 
Appeals 11 
Hearings 
Officer 
GS-
12-15 61,486 676,346 
Federal 
Maritime 
Com-
mission 
Bureau 
of 
Consu-
mer 
Com-
plaints 
and 
Licens-
ing 3 
Settle-
ment 
Officer 
GM-
13-15 73,115 219,345 
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Agency Office 
Number 
of 
Hearing 
Officials 
Title of 
Position 
GS, 
SES 
or 
Other 
Pay 
Plan 
2015 
Lowest GS 
Level Basic 
Pay 
Total Cost 
based on 
2002 
Numbers 
with 2015 
Salaries 
Depart-
ment of 
the Navy 
Board of 
the 
Correc-
tion of 
Naval 
Records 48 
BCNR 
Board 
Member 
SES 
GS-13 73,115 3,509,520 
U.S. 
Merit 
System 
Protec-
tion 
Board 
Office of 
Regional 
Opera-
tions 
62* 
5  
5 
Admini-
strative 
Judge 
Chief 
Admini-
strative 
Judge 
(50%) 
Regional 
Director 
(15%) 
SES 
GS-
13-15 73,115 4,533,130 
Environ-
mental 
Protec-
tion 
Agency 
Office of 
Enforce-
ment 
and 
Compli-
ance 
Assur-
ance 11 
Regional 
Judicial 
Officer 
GS-
14/15 86,399 950,389 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Energy 
Office of 
Hearings 
and 
Appeals 19 
SES 
Office 
Director
Hearing 
Officer-
Attorney 
Examin-
er 
SES 
GS-
14/15 86,399 1,641,581 
  
Sum of 
Hearing 
Officials 268         
 
*counted numbers in bold font only, not part-time AJs 
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APPENDIX C. ISOLATED LOW-PAID AJS 
Agency Office 
Number 
of 
Hearing 
Officials 
Title of 
Position
GS, SES 
or Other 
Pay Plan
2015 
Lowest 
GS 
Level 
Basic 
Pay 
Total Cost 
based on 
2002 
Numbers 
with 2015 
Salaries 
Cost if 
ALJS* 
Difference 
in Cost if 
ALJs 
U.S. 
National 
Labor 
Rela-
tions 
Board 
Office of 
the 
General 
Counsel 
Any 
Profes-
sional 
Employee 
of the 
Regional 
Offices 
can serve 
as a 
Hearing 
Official 
Field 
Examin-
er GS-7-13 34,662 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Veterans 
Affairs 
Veterans 
Benefits 
Admini-
stration 244 
Hearing 
Officer GS-9-13 42,399 10,345,356 25,839,600 15,494,244 
U.S. 
Equal 
Employ-
ment 
Oppor-
tunity 
Com-
mission 
Field 
Coordi-
nation 
Pro-
grams 
Division 99 
Admini-
strative 
Judge 
GS-11-
14 51,298 5,078,502 10,484,100 5,405,598 
U.S. 
Equal 
Employ-
ment 
Oppor-
tunity 
Com-
mission 
Field 
Coor-
dination 
Pro-
grams 
Division 
12 (Con-
tract) 
Admini-
strative 
Judge 
GS-11-
14 51,298 615,576 1,270,800 655,224 
U.S. 
National 
Labor 
Rela-
tions 
Board 
Office of 
the 
General 
Counsel 
Any 
Profes-
sional 
Employee 
of the 
Regional 
Offices 
can serve 
as a 
Hearing 
Official Attorney
GS-11-
14 51,298 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Labor 
Office of 
Workers 
Com-
pensa-
tion 
Program 24 
Hearing 
Rep-
resenta-
tives 
GS-12/
13 61,486 1,475,664 2,541,600 1,065,936 
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Agency Office 
Number 
of 
Hearing 
Officials 
Title of 
Position
GS, SES 
or Other 
Pay Plan
2015 
Lowest 
GS 
Level 
Basic 
Pay 
Total Cost 
based on 
2002 
Numbers 
with 2015 
Salaries 
Cost if 
ALJS* 
Difference 
in Cost if 
ALJs 
U.S. 
Railroad 
Retire-
ment 
Board 
Bureau 
of Hear-
ings and 
Appeals 11 
Hear-
ings 
Officer 
GS-12-
15 61,486 676,346 1,164,900 488,554 
Federal 
Mari-
time 
Com-
mission 
Bureau 
of 
Consu-
mer 
Com-
plaints 
and 
Licens-
ing 3 
Settle-
ment 
Officer 
GM-13-
15 73,115 219,345 317,700 98,355 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Agricul-
ture 
National 
Appeals 
Division 70 
Hearing 
Officer GS-13 73,115 5,118,050 7,413,000 2,294,950 
Depart-
ment of 
the Navy 
Board of 
the 
Correc-
tion of 
Naval 
Records 48 
BCNR 
Board 
Member
SES 
GS-13 73,115 3,509,520 5,083,200 1,573,680 
U.S. 
Merit 
System 
Protec-
tion 
Board 
Office of 
Regional 
Opera-
tions 
62* 
5 (50% 
Time) 
5 (15% 
Time) 
Admini-
strative 
Judge
Chief 
Admini-
strative 
Judge
Regional 
Director
SES 
GS-13-
15 73,115 4,533,130 6,565,800 2,032,670 
Envi-
ronmen-
tal 
Protec-
tion 
Agency 
Office of 
Enforce-
ment 
and 
Compli-
ance 
Assur-
ance 11 
Regional 
Judicial 
Officer 
GS-14/
15 86,399 950,389 1,164,900 214,511 
U.S. 
Depart-
ment of 
Energy 
Office of 
Hear-
ings and 
Appeals 19 
SES 
Office 
Director
Hearing 
Officer-
Attorney 
Examin-
er 
SES 
GS-14/
15 86,399 1,641,581 2,012,100 370,519 
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Agency Office 
Number 
of 
Hearing 
Officials 
Title of 
Position
GS, SES 
or Other 
Pay Plan
2015 
Lowest 
GS 
Level 
Basic 
Pay 
Total Cost 
based on 
2002 
Numbers 
with 2015 
Salaries 
Cost if 
ALJS* 
Difference 
in Cost if 
ALJs 
Sum of 
hearing 
officers 
(exclud-
ing AJs 
in C7 
and 
C16) 529 34,163,459 63,857,700 29,694,241 
    
(count-
ed 
numbers 
in bold 
font, not 
part-
time 
AJs) 603    
    
*ALJ 
Basic 
Salary 105,900 
 
